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POLICENTRISM, POLITICAL
MOBILIZATION, AND THE PROMISE
OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS
BRIAN RAY*

I. INTRODUCTION

One remarkable constitutional development of the twentieth century is
the broad inclusion of socioeconomic rights in new constitutions.' Because
these provisions impose affirmative obligations on the governments
enforceable by the courts, they represent significant constitutional
developments. They also raise difficult questions over whether and how to
enforce these rights.
There is a lively debate about whether modem constitutions should
include socioeconomic rights like these, defined here to mean any rights that
relate to minimum survival needs or core requirements for an adequate quality
of life.' This debate has produced an extensive literature concerning the nature
of socioeconomic rights and whether they are qualitatively different from civil
The arguments generally center on whether
and political rights.'
socioeconomic rights are uniquely "positive" in that they require expenditures
of state resources in contrast to civil and political rights, which are "negative"
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I would like to thank James
Brudney, Sheldon Gelman, Mark Kende, Richard Goldstone, Miguel Schor, Milena Sterio, Mark
Tushnet, Jonathan Witmer-Rich, and participants in the 2008 Comparative Law Works-in-Progress
Workshop, especially Daniel Halberstam, for their helpful comments. Stuart Wilson of CALS
generously provided invaluable information about and insight into the City ofJohannesburglitigation
and settlement. I am grateful to the Cleveland-Marshall fund for research support during the summer
of 2007. This project has its roots in draft remarks I prepared for Justice Goldstone in 2003 while
serving as his foreign law clerk at the South African Constitutional Court. I would like to thank
Justice Goldstone for giving me that extraordinary opportunity and for his continued support and
encouragement of my efforts to study the Court's work. I would also like to thank the Rotary
Foundation for providing funding during that year.
See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 220 (2007) ("Constitutions drafted after
World War II almost universally included social welfare provisions.").
2 What rights should be included under the rubric of "socioeconomic"--and
indeed as discussed
below, whether the category makes conceptual or practical sense at all-is a topic of considerable
academic discussion. See, e.g., Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking
Economic and Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 363, 364 (2002) (focusing on
the right to work as a socioeconomic right); Justice Albie Sachs, Social and Economic Rights: Can
They Be Made Justiciable?, 53 SMU L. Rev. 1381 (2000) (defining socioeconomic rights as "the
minimum decencies of life"); CECILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION:
GOVERNMENT AND THE DECENT LIFE 5 (2000) (defining social rights as the right "to adequate
minimum income, housing, health care, and education").
3 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and
Liberal Justification, 1
INT'L J. CONST. LAW 13 (2003) (discussing theoretical objections to constitutionalization of social and
economic rights).
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in that they involve only limiting government intrusion into the private sphere.'
On one side of the debate, scholars such as Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein
have argued that the theoretical differences between these categories is
unhelpful at best and incoherent at worst pointing out that all rights-even the
supposedly "negative" ones-rely on state expenditures.5 On the other side,
critics argue these rights should be characterized differently because they
involve courts in adjudicating disputes over complicated resource allocation
decisions that are better left to the legislative and executive branches.'
The controversy over the nature of socioeconomic rights and whether
constitutions should include them is connected to the issue of how to enforce
these rights when they are included.
South Africa's post-apartheid
Constitution, which established entrenched, judicially enforceable
constitutional rights for the first time in South African history,7 includes
several socioeconomic rights.8 The South African Constitutional Court in its
See, e.g., Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes
of Sand or Justiciable
Guarantees?Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1992).
As Scott and Macklem point out, the decision to divide the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights into the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) embodies this split. See also TUSHNET,
supra note 1 (describing the conventional argument against judicial enforcement of socioeconomic
rights); DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 119-26 (2004) (summarizing arguments
over the differences between positive and negative rights).
5 STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON
TAXES 37-48 (2000).
Holmes and Sunstein argue that the implicit premise behind the
negative/positive distinction is that "immunity from invasion by the state involves no significant
entitlement to financial resources" and that this premise is fundamentally flawed. Holmes and
Sunstein attempt to show that all rights depend on state expenditures for meaningful protection. Id.;
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) ("All constitutional rights have budgetary
implications; all constitutional rights cost money .... It follows that insofar as they are costly, social
and economic rights are not unique."); Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms ofJudicial
Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1896 (2003) (noting that "sometimes the enforcement of first- and
second-generation rights has some implications for government budgets," and concluding that "[t]he
examples of rights-protections with budget consequences could be proliferated almost endlessly.");
Marius Pieterse, Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 20 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 383, 389-90 (2004) (arguing that "it has been shown that resource implications also flow
from vindicating civil and political rights, that it is possible to award more precise content to socioeconomic rights and that both 'categories' of rights have 'positive' as well as 'negative' dimensions.");
DAVID M. BEATrY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 153 (2005) ("Even in a minimalist nightwatchman
state, the entrenchment of the most basic civil and political rights in a country's constitution
necessarily imposes a duty on government to enact and enforce whatever laws are required to
guarantee their efficacy.").
6 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 857, 863-67 (2001)
(proposing that the test for distinguishing between negative and positive rights should be whether the
right would be automatically filled in the absence of a government); see also Michael J. Dennis &
David P. Steward, Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an
InternationalComplaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 465 (2004) (asserting that "[firom the outset, and for good reason, economic,
social and cultural rights, unlike civil and political rights, have been defined primarily as aspirational
goals to be achieved progressively.").
7 Entrenched rights and judicial review were expressly included in the
constitutional principles
that were negotiated as part of the transition from apartheid and operated as an interim constitution
during the final constitutional drafting process. See Certificationof the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), Annexure 2, Const. Principle II (S. Aft.) ("Everyone shall
enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be
provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution, which shall be
drafted after having given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained in Chapter
3 of this Constitution.")
8 S. AFR. CONST.
1996 §§ 26-29.
4
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decision approving the new Constitution specifically held that these rights are
justiciable in the same fashion as the civil and political rights in the

Constitution.9
Since then it has become a leading example of a court dealing with

these enforcement issues, and its early decisions have been hailed by many as

Mark Tushnet
developing a uniquely effective enforcement approach.'
suggests that the Court has adopted a "weak-form" approach to enforcement
that gives the legislature a substantial role to play in interpreting these rights.
Cass Sunstein similarly argues that the court has adopted an administrative law
approach that limits the Court's role to assessing whether policies adopted by
the other branches are reasonable. Many in South Africa, however, have been
critical of the Court's approach arguing that it fails to give full effect to the
promise of these rights by inappropriately limiting the Court's role." This

Article addresses the debate over the Constitutional Court's enforcement of
socioeconomic rights and draws on the Court's most recent cases and other
developments to offer a new framework for understanding the Court's
approach.
Both sides of the debate have failed to adequately consider two key

aspects of the Court's early cases. First, the Court has consistently left open
the possibility for evolution towards stronger forms of enforcement for these
rights in subsequent cases. Second, in two of these cases, the Court has
concretely demonstrated its willingness to take a direct role in enforcing
socioeconomic rights. Focusing on these two aspects of the early cases, it is
evident that the Court has described the possibility for a mixed form of review
that is potentially more robust than both sides of the debate claim.

This mixed form of review is best described as a "policentric" form of
review.' 2 The distinctive characteristic of policentric review is a sharing of
interpretive authority with the legislative and executive branches of
9 The Court specifically rejected the argument that socioeconomic rights are "inconsistent
with
the separation of powers required by [the directive principles] because the judiciary would have to
encroach upon the proper terrain of the legislature and executive." Certificationof the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (S. Aft.).
10 See Tushnet, supra note 5; CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS

DO 234 (2002); see also Richard J. Goldstone, A South African Perspective on Social and Economic
Rights, 13 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 4 (2006); Mark Kende, The South African Constitutional Courts
Construction ofSocio-Economic Rights: A Response to Critics, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 617 (2004); Paul
Nolette, Lessons Learned from the South African Constitutional Court: Toward a Third Way of
JudicialEnforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 91 (2003).
11 See, e.g., Sandra Liebenberg, The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic
Rights, 21 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 22 (2005) (arguing that the Court's approach is "inadequate" when
applied "to claims involving a deprivation of the basic necessities of life .... "); Marius Pieterse,
Possibilities & Pitfalls in the Domestic Enforcement of Social Rights: Contemplating the South
African Experience, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 882 (2004) (characterizing the Court's socioeconomic rights
jurisprudence as "paradoxical," containing tendencies that are "some cause for concern"); David
Bilchitz, Towards a ReasonableApproach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundationsfor Future
Socioeconomic Rights Jurisprudence,19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2003) (criticizing the Court's refusal
to interpret socioeconomic rights as containing a "minimum core"); Danie Brand, The
Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or What Are SocioEconomic Rights For?, in RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN A TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTION 41 (Henk
Botha et al. eds., 2003) (describing the Court's approach as "limited").
12 As discussed in more detail in Part III, the concept of a "policentric" approach comes from
Robert Post and Reva Siegel's article, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
PolicentricInterpretationof the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003).
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government and a consequent willingness by courts to respect constitutional
interpretations by those branches that differ from their own. The policentric
approach has several key advantages over a traditional juricentric approach
that are particularly important in the socioeconomic rights area. Policentric
review enhances the informational basis for implementing these rights by
giving the courts the benefit of the other branches' better informed
perspectives on the complex policy choices involved in enforcing these rights.
At the same time, extending interpretive authority to the other branches also
establishes a democratic basis for making those policy tradeoffs.
Most importantly, policentric review improves the prospects for
meaningful implementation of socioeconomic rights in the long term. It
creates incentives for the legislature and executive branches to take seriously
their roles in enforcing these rights by giving them the authority to develop
independent interpretations of what these rights require. And, by placing the
interpretive function expressly into the political sphere, policentric review
encourages the development of political mobilization to seek responsive policy
changes by the government.
Finally, the judicial role is highly flexible under policentric review.
This means that courts can operate along a continuum of relatively weaker or
stronger interventions in each case. At the weaker end of this continuum,
courts can defer completely to the judgment of the government that a particular
policy is the most effective mechanism for enforcing a particular right. At the
stronger end, courts remain free to order specific changes to a program and
even to issue structural injunctions to ensure compliance with their orders.
Recognizing that the Constitutional Court has begun to develop a
policentric approach answers the critics' principal objection that the Court's
deferential approach to enforcement in its early cases has diminished the force
of these rights. At the same time, the flexibility that the Court has retained to
take a more direct role in enforcing socioeconomic rights requires revision of
the relatively restrained approach described by those who have commented
favorably on the Court's current approach.
Parts I and II of this Article outline the Court's early cases and the
debate that has developed around them. Part III critiques both sides of this
debate and develops a new account of the Constitutional Court's approach to
socioeconomic rights.
Part IV analyzes recent developments in the
socioeconomic rights area, including the City of Johannesburg litigation as
well as recent lower court cases to assess the effectiveness of the Court's
policentric approach.
II. JUSTICIABILITY AND THE EARLY CASES

A. The Socioeconomic Rights Provisions
The question of whether South Africa's post-Apartheid Constitution
should include socioeconomic rights was hotly contested.' 3 Ultimately,
13 This debate was summarized in several articles in
the South African Journal on Human Rights.
See, e.g., Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charterof Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S.
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express rights to housing," health care, food, water, social security,'" and
education were included in the new constitution.' 6 In addition to these specific
rights, the Constitution includes affirmative dimensions in other rights. The
right to property in Chapter 2, Section 25 includes rights against
uncompensated government appropriation and the affirmative requirement that
the state take "reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on
an equitable basis."' 7 Similarly, Chapter 2, Section 28, titled "Children,"
includes a series of affirmative rights including the right to "family care," and
"basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services."' 8
The cases that have come before the Court to date have focused on the
right to housing contained in Section 26 and the rights to health care, food,
water, and social security contained in Section 27. These rights are all
qualified by what is referred to as an "internal limitations clause."' 9 Each right
has three clauses. The first clause establishes a positive right. Section 26(1)
creates a "right to have access to adequate housing." Section 27 provides
rights to access to health care, food and water, and social security. The second
clause, which is worded identically in both Section 26 and Section 27, then
limits the obligations of the state to fulfill these rights: "The state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
achieve the progressive realisation of [these] rights." ' 2' The third clause in each
contains a prohibition against certain government actions. Section 26(3)
prohibits arbitrary evictions, and Section 27(3) prohibits refusal of emergency
medical treatment.
As discussed in more detail below, the Constitutional Court has held
that the first two clauses in Sections 26 and 27 must always be read together.
In other words, the Court has held that the positive obligations imposed by
AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 464 (1992) (summarizing debate over inclusion of socioeconomic rights and
arguing for inclusion of such rights); D.M. Davis, The CaseAgainst the Inclusion of Socio-Economic
Demands in a Bill of Rights Except As Directive Principles, 8 S.AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 475 (1992)
(summarizing the same debate and arguing for inclusion only on a limited basis); see also Dennis
Davis, Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: The Record of the Constitutional Court After Ten
Years, 5 ESR REv. 3 (2004) (describing the early debate and the objections to including
socioeconomic rights).
14 S.AFR. CONST.
1996 § 26.
15 Id. §
27.
16 Id. § 29.
17 Id. § 25(5).
18 Id. § 25(l)(b)-(c). The rights delineated in Section 25 do not contain the internal limitation
that the other socioeconomic rights mentioned all have.
Whether this omission grants the
Constitutional Court greater powers of enforcement is an unresolved question that has yet to be tested
in the South African courts.
19 These subsections are referred to as "internal" limitations clauses
to distinguish them from
Chapter 2, Section 36, which provides a "general" limitations clause. Section 36 is similar to the
limitations clause in the Canadian Charter and in effect permits the government to pass laws that limit
the rights contained in Chapter 2 under specific circumstances. Another unresolved question is
whether the general limitations clause applies to the socioeconomic rights that contain internal
limitations clauses. See, e.g., Kevin Iles, Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond the Internal
Limitations Clauses, 20 S.AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 448 (analyzing the relationship between the general
limitations clause and the internal limitations clause in Section 27).
20 S.AFR. CONST. 1996 § 26(2). The rights to health care, food, water, and social security, which
are all contained in Section 27, are structured in precisely the same way as the right to housing.
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each right are always qualified by the internal limitations clause. This
interpretive move has been the focal point of the principal criticisms of the
Court's approach to these rights.
B. The Early Cases
The Court has developed its approach to the positive dimensions of
Sections 26 and 27 in four main cases.2' I divide these early cases into two
separate categories. The Court's first two cases, Soobramoney v Minister of
Health2 and Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,3
decided in 1998 and 2000, establish its default approach of deference to the
government combined with weak remedies for constitutional violations. In
these cases, the Court's initial approach has been to give considerable
deference to the government's justification for particular policy and budget
decisions that implicate socioeconomic rights. Even where the Court has
found that a particular government program fails to meet the constitutional
standard, it has been initially reluctant to impose a direct remedy. Instead the
Court has preferred to issue declarations of unconstitutionality, which create
considerable flexibility for the government to determine what policy changes
are necessary for compliance. Nonetheless, in both of these cases, the Court
has consistently stated that it retains the power to take a more direct role.
In the following two socioeconomic rights cases, Minister of Health v
Treatment Action Campaign,24 decided in 2002, and Khosa v Minister of Social
Development, 5 decided in 2003, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to
take a more direct role. In these cases, the Court closely scrutinized the
government's justifications for the challenged programs and was willing to
apply more direct remedies than in its first two cases. This change in approach
is tied in both cases to evidence that the government was unwilling or unable
to take its constitutional duties seriously when it developed the programs under
review.
I include the Court's most recent two cases dealing with
socioeconomic rights in the next Subpart as an example of what I have called
"second order" cases, i.e., follow-up cases challenging the government's
response to an initial declaration of unconstitutionality. In these much more
recent cases, the Court has started to address the South African Government's
attempts to implement the Grootboom decision. While the results are
somewhat mixed, it appears that the Court approves of the much more
aggressive approach taken by lower South African courts in response to
failures by the government to fully comply with the Grootboom requirements.

21 The Court has also addressed the negative dimension
of Section 26 in several cases. See, e.g.,
PortElizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (S. Aft.).
22 See generallySoobramoney v Minister of
Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Aft.).
23 See generally Government of the Republic of South
Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) (S. Aft.).
24 See generally Minister of Health v Treatment Action
Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.
Aft-.).
" See generally Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)
(S. Aft.).
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This suggests that the Court itself may be more willing to take a more direct
role in future cases.
1. Soobramoney and Grootboom: Early Deference and Weak Remedies
The Court did not address the socioeconomic rights provisions until
2000 when it decided Soobramoney v Minister of Health.26 The plaintiffappellant in Soobramoney was a diabetic suffering from kidney failure who
sought to prolong his life through regular dialysis at a state hospital in Durban.
The hospital, however, had only twenty dialysis machines, some of which were
in poor condition, and had been unable to provide Soobramoney with the
requested treatment.
Soobramoney argued that the hospital's refusal to treat him violated
Section 27(3) of the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o one may be
refused emergency medical treatment."" He did not rely on the more general
right to have access to health care imposed by Section 27(1) in part because
Section 27(3), unlike Section 27(2), is not qualified by the resources limitation
clause discussed above.
Despite this, the Court considered Soobramoney's claim under both
Sections. Interpreting Section 27(3) somewhat narrowly, the Court found that
the provision did not apply on these facts because Soobramoney's disease was
chronic and did not involve "a sudden catastrophe which calls for immediate
medical attention ....
The Court went on to consider the application of Section 27(1). It first
indicated that it would give a large margin of discretion to the budgetary
priorities set by the provincial government and the "difficult decisions" made
by the hospital administrators in the context of limited resources:
A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions
taken in good faith by the political organs and medical
authorities whose responsibilities it is to deal with such
matters.2 9
Applying this standard, the Court found that the hospital's guidelines for
determining which patients qualified for dialysis treatment were reasonable
and that they had been applied "fairly and rationally" in this case."
The Court thus established a restrained approach to interpreting the
right to health care in Soobramoney: It deferred to the government's
justification for the resource allocation policy it had adopted and refused to

26
27
28
29
30

Soobramoney v Ministerof Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Aft.).
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 27(3).
Soobramoney v Ministerof Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at paras. 20-21
(S. Aft.).
Id. at para. 29.

Id. at para. 25.
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second-guess the government's criteria for allocating dialysis resources once it
determined those criteria met a basic rationality standard.
But the Court nonetheless signaled a willingness to look behind
government justifications for particular socioeconomic programs where
appropriate. Specifically, the Court stated that those justifications must be not
only "rational," which would imply deference to all but facially spurious
justifications, but also "taken in good faith."" This "good faith" requirement
suggests that the Court will not only test the government's policy decisions
against an objective rationality standard but that it will consider subjective
evidence that the government's actions, while objectively reasonable, are
designed to evade its constitutional obligations. This subjective aspect of the
Court's analysis is significant because it carves out the possibility for more
direct scrutiny of government justifications by the Court than a purely
objective rational basis standard would allow.
Two years later in Grootboom, the Court addressed the right to
housing under Section 26 of the Constitution. The Grootboom plaintiffs were
evicted by court order from an informal settlement they had erected on private
land in an area near Cape Town. The plaintiffs resettled on a governmentowned sports field nearby and after first seeking to resolve the dispute
informally, brought suit against the several local, provincial, and national
government entities seeking to enforce their obligations to provide access to
housing under Section 26 and to provide the children in the settlement access
to basic shelter under Section 28(l)(c)."
At that time there was a range of programs in place at the national and
provincial levels aimed at addressing the acute housing shortage in South
Africa. The respondents argued that these programs satisfied their obligations
under both Sections 26 and 28. The high court agreed that these programs
satisfied the qualified obligation to provide access to adequate housing under
Section 26 but held that Section 28(l)(c) required the state to provide shelter to
children and their parents whenever parents could not irrespective of the
availability of resources." As a result, the high court, in a fairly detailed and
specific order, required the state to provide shelter to the minor plaintiffs and
their parents. The high court also retained jurisdiction and ordered the
respondents to present within three
months under oath a report detailing their
4
efforts to implement the order.'
On appeal, the Constitutional Court reversed the High Court's ruling
with respect to Section 28(1)(c) but held that the existing housing programs
violated Section 26. The Court first reviewed these programs and found that
they constituted "a major achievement" and were clearly "aimed at achieving
the progressive realization of the right of access to adequate housing" required
by Section 26." Nonetheless, the Court found that the existing programs fell
short of the requirements of Section 26 because they completely failed to take
31
32

Id.at para. 29.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 28(1)(c).

See the discussion in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000
(11)
BCLR 1169 (CC) at paras. 14-15, 70 (S.Afr.).
34 See id. at
para. 16.
35 See id. at
para. 53.
33
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into account
the emergency needs of individuals like the Grootboom
36
residents.
This was the first case in which the Court held that a government
program violated one of the socioeconomic rights, and the Court took the
opportunity to elaborate on the reasonableness standard it had first articulated
in Soobramoney." The Court began by rejecting the argument put forth by
several amici that the Constitution's socioeconomic rights should be
interpreted to contain "minimum core" requirements. The concept of a
minimum core was developed in the context of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
In essence, it would
establish an objective minimum standard. Failure to meet that standard by the
government would mean automatic violation of the right. The Court rejected
this approach as insufficiently flexible and dependent on a level of knowledge
and expertise that the Court lacked in this case."
The Court then turned to the reasonableness test and emphasized the
principal role of the other branches of government in developing appropriate
policies to enforce these rights: "A court considering reasonableness will not
enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been
adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent."4 ° In addition,
the Court was careful to note that enforcement of these rights requires
36

Id. at para. 69.

37 Id.at para. 41. Marius Pieterse suggests that the Court in Grootboom
in fact "abandoned [the

Soobramoney standard] in favour of an analysis of the reasonableness of the challenged state policy."
Pieterse, Coming to Terms with JudicialEnforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTS. 383, 410 (2004). In Pieterse's view, the Court in Soobramoney applied an overly deferential
standard by evaluating government programs on "the basis of [the government's] rationality and bona
fides only." Id. at 410. But Grootboom struck "a more acceptable balance between judicial vigilance
and deference .
I..."
1d. I disagree somewhat with this characterization of the cases. In both cases,
the Court deferentially evaluated the existing government program and accepted the government's
representations concerning the scope and effect of each program at face value.
Compare
Soobramoney v Minister of Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at para. 25 (S. Aft.) ("It has not been
suggested that [the hospital's] guidelines are unreasonable or that they were not applied fairly and
rationally ....), with Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR
1169 (CC) at para. 52 (S. Afr.) ("What has been done in execution of [the housing program] is a major
achievement.... It is a programme that is aimed at achieving the progressive realization of the right
of access to adequate housing."). The critical difference in Grootboom is that the Court determined
the government's program by its own admission left out a critical sector of society. Government of the
Republic ofSouth Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at para. 52 (S. Aft.) (noting that the
definition of housing development in the national housing legislation included "no express provision
to facilitate access to temporary relief for people [in desparate need]."). Thus, the Court still
maintained the same relatively uncritical acceptance of the government's claims regarding its own
programs, but in Grootboom, unlike Soobramoney, the Court found that what the government claimed
its program accomplished fell short of what the constitution requires. As I discuss below, both cases
contrast starkly with the much more skeptical stance the Court adopted towards the government's
claims about the programs at issue in TAC and Khosa. See infra text accompanying notes 46-87.
38 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Covenant
on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment No. 3, at para. 10, (Dec. 14, 1990), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CESCR+General+comment+3.En?OpenDocument.
39 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC) at para.
33 (S. Aft.) ("There are difficult questions relating to the definition of the minimum core in the context
of a right to have access to adequate housing .... [E]ven if it were appropriate to [have regard to the
minimum core concept], it could not be done unless sufficient information is placed before the court to
enable it to determine the minimum core in any given context."). The Court emphasized that the U.N.
Committee developed the minimum core standard over a period of years and with the benefit of
reports about signatory countries each year. Id.
40 Id. at para.
42.
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considerable flexibility: "It is necessary to recognize that a wide range of
possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations.""
But the Court also made clear that the deference to legislative
judgments required under this standard is not absolute and that superficial
compliance through development of a program on paper is insufficient to meet
the reasonableness standard: "Mere legislation is not enough. The state is
obliged to act to achieve the intended result, and the legislative measures will
invariably have to be supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and
programmes implemented by the executive."42 The Court also forcefully stated
that the qualified language in these rights does not deprive the Court of the
power to meaningfully enforce them:
The fact that [the Constitution requires] realisation over
time, or in other words progressively ...should not be
misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all
meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary
flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world
and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring
full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On
the other hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the
overall objective ... which is to establish clear obligations
for State parties in respect of the full realisation of the
rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move
as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that
goal.43
The Court then indicated a clear willingness to carefully scrutinize
claims of reasonableness by the government and to take a more direct role in
enforcing socioeconomic rights when necessary. According to the Court, to
be reasonable any measures aimed at implementing these rights must address
the needs of all sectors in society, in particular the most vulnerable. Therefore,
even if the measures demonstrate an overall advance in the realization of the
right, if they "fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they may
not pass the test."" The existing housing programs, while presenting an
otherwise apparently reasonable response to the long- and medium-term
housing needs, failed this aspect of the reasonableness test. 5
Despite finding a concrete violation of Section 26, the Court limited its
remedy to a general declaration that the existing policy was unconstitutional,
which left it to the government to devise the specifics of a constitutionally
Id. at para. 41
Id. at para. 42 (emphasis added).
43 Id. at para. 45 (quoting U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Covenant
on Economic, Social and CulturalRights (CESCR) General Comment No. 3, at para. 9, (Dec. 14,
1990),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CESCR+General+conunent+3.En?OpenDocument.).
'A Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at para.
44 (S. Aft.).
41
42

45

Id.
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sufficient program. The Court was also careful to minimize its role in
enforcing the remedy emphasizing the need for cooperation: "[A]ll three
spheres of government" must work "in
6 consultation with each other" to devise
a coordinated state housing program.
The Court also refused to retain oversight over the government's
compliance with its order. Instead, the Court called on the South African
Human Rights Commission, a quasi-government entity established by the
Constitution, to monitor compliance pursuant to its authority under Section
S84(l)(c) of the Constitution.
2. TAC and Khosa: Implementing the Good Faith Requirement
The Court issued its first direct remedy in a socioeconomic rights case
two years later in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign ("TA C'), 4
where it was again faced with interpreting the health care right in Section 27.
In TAC, the plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of a government program that
provided the anti-retroviral drug nevirapine to pregnant mothers but limited
provision of the drug to a small number of research and training sites and
banned the use of it outside of these sites. The Court relied on Grootboom's
articulation of the reasonableness test to find that the state breached its
obligation not to impair the Section 27 right to healthcare by restricting
provision of the drug even though it had the resources to provide it more
broadly.
Significantly, the Court viewed with considerable skepticism the
justifications put forth by the government for restricting distribution of the
drug. The government argued, for example, that there were substantial
questions concerning the efficacy of nevirapine in preventing mother-to-child
transmission of HIV.4 9 The Court rejected this objection finding that "[t]hese
allegations by the Minister . . . are, however, not supported by the data on
which [the government's expert] relies."5
The Court used similarly dismissive language to reject the
government's arguments that the single dose program risked developing drugresistant strains of HIV finding that "[a]t most there is a possibility of such
resistance persisting" even if it were to develop.' And the Court rejected outof-hand the argument that nevirapine posed safety concerns to mother and
child: "The evidence shows that safety is no more than a hypothetical
issue.... There is, however, no evidence to suggest that dose of nevirapine to
both mother and child at the time of birth will result in harm to either of

46

Id. at para. 40.

47

Id. at para. 97.
See generally Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.

48

Aft.).

49 Id. at paras. 57-58.
50 Id. at para. 58.
51

Id. at para. 59.
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them." 2 The Court went on to criticize the safety argument as baldly
inconsistent with the government's decision to initiate the pilot program: "The
decision by the government to provide nevirapine to mothers and infants at the
research sites is consistent only with the government itself being satisfied as to
the efficacy and safety of the drug. These sites cater for approximately 10% of
all births in the public sector and it is unthinkable that the government would
gamble with the lives or health of thousands of mothers and infants.""
The intensive scrutiny the Court employed in TAC is a marked
departure from the deference accorded to the government's evidence in
Soobramoney and Grootboom." Although the Court did not expressly
reference the good faith requirement it articulated in Soobramoney as the
reason for this increased scrutiny of the government's arguments in TACindeed the Court never expressly acknowledges a change in its approach at
all-the political background to the dispute combined with oblique references
in the judgment itself to that background suggest that the Court was reacting to
what it perceived as a refusal by the government to take seriously its
constitutional obligations under Section 27 when developing the pilot program.
Early in the judgment the Court noted in an unusual aside that "[i]n our
country, the issue of HIV/AIDS has for some time been fraught with an
unusual
degree , of
political,
ideological
and
emotional
contention.... Nevertheless, it is regrettable that this contention and emotion
has spilt over into this case." 5 The Court is referring here to the political and
legal battles between TAC and the government over the government's AIDS
policy that dates back to 1998. Mark Heywood has summarized in detail the
history behind this contentious relationship and the specific events that gave
rise to the TAC litigation.56 As Heywood notes, the government consistently
dragged its feet, first in approving nevirapine for use in preventing mother-tochild-transmission of AIDS and then in setting up the pilot program itself."
TAC obtained the files documenting the government's approval process during
the course of the TAC litigation. According to Heywood,
they showed that some of the public justifications
provided for the delay by the MCC were misleading as the
most important determinations regarding safety and
efficacy had been made in 2000. They also suggested that
those provinces that had delayed the start of pilot sites
because Nevirapine had not yet been registered were, in
reality, being delayed by a technicality that was probably
politically motivated.5
Id. at para. 60
Id. at para. 62 (emphasis added).
54 See, e.g., Brand, supra
note 11, at 41.
55 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 20 (S. Aft.).
56 Mark Heywood, Preventing Mother-to-ChildHIV Transmission in South
Africa: Background,
Strategies and Outcomes of the TreatmentAction Campaign Case Against the Minister of Health, 19
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 278 (2003).
57 Id. at 285-90.
58 See Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at 289 (S. Aft.).
52

53
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TAC documented this history in the papers submitted to the Court
during the litigation, and the Court initially ordered supplemental briefing by
both parties on the nevirapine approval process.5 9 The Court ultimately found
that resolution of that dispute was unnecessary to its decision because "[m]ost
if not all of the disputation is beside the point. The essential facts, as we see
them, are not seriously in dispute."O Among the undisputed "essential facts"
that the Court went on to detail were the following: nevirapine was approved
by the South African Medicines Control Council as early as 1998, which "by
definition entail[ed] a positive finding as to its quality, safety and efficacy." 6'
But the quality, safety and efficacy of nevirapine were, of course, precisely the
reasons relied on by the government for restricting nevirapine to the pilot sites.
Thus, the indefensibility of many of the government's arguments was plainly
not lost on the Court.62
The next notable feature of the judgment is that the Court rejected the
government's arguments that courts' remedial powers when enforcing
socioeconomic rights are limited to issuing declarations of unconstitutionality.
In a striking and extended section, the Court explained in detail that the
Constitution grants the Court broad remedial powers that extend to the granting
of supervisory injunctions 3
But the Court paired this extensive explication of the range of its
remedial powers with a deferential discussion of the need for courts to respect
the power of the executive when enforcing these rights. After concluding that
"courts may-and if need be must-use their wide powers to make orders that
affect policy as well as legislation," the Court softened its rhetoric in the next
paragraph noting that "the executive is always free to change policies where it
considers it appropriate to do so."' And the Court added the qualification that
"[c]ourt orders concerning policy choices made by the executive should
therefore not be formulated in ways that preclude the executive from making
such legitimate choices."65
The Court then went on to reject the high court's decision to impose an
injunction in this case. The Court reiterated that the judiciary has the power to
impose injunctive relief but signaled that such orders are most appropriate
where there has been "a failure to heed declaratory orders or other relief
granted by a court in a particular case., 66 The Court then found that "[t]he

59 See

id.

60 Ministerof Health v TreatmentAction Campaign 2002
61 Id. atpara.

(5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 21 (S. Afr.).

12.

62 Heywood also notes that during the course of the two-day oral argument
in TAC, the Court
"occasionally reveal[ed] their frustrations with the misconduct that appeared to characterize much of
the government's case." Heywood, supra note 56, at 310 (citing personal notes taken during the
Constitutional Court hearings (April 3, May 3-4, 2002)).
63 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC)
at paras. 96-114 (S.
Afr.).
64 Id. atpara. 114.
65 Id.
66 Id. at para. 129.
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government has always respected and executed the orders of this Court. There
is no reason to believe that it will not do so in the present case."67
Echoing its call in Grootboom for civil society to participate in
implementing these rights, " the Court stated that "[w]e consider it important
that all sectors of the community, in particular civil society, should cooperate
in the steps needed to achieve the goal [of providing treatment]. 69
The most significant aspect of the decision, however, is the specific
terms of the order. In a marked departure from the previous two cases, the
Court in TAC required the government to take specific action to correct the
constitutional defect by extending the provision of nevirapine beyond the pilot
sites. But later in that same order, the Court gave the government express
permission to ignore that directive and determine for itself what specific action
Section 27 requires: "The orders made in paragraph 3 do not preclude the
government from adapting its policy in a manner consistent with the
constitution if equally appropriate or better methods become available for the
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV." 7
The Court's next decision directly interpreting the socioeconomic
rights provisions came two years later in 2004. Khosa v Minister of Social
Development ("Khosa") dealt with whether the government could exclude noncitizen permanent residents from the socioeconomic assistance provided to
citizens.7' The plaintiffs, all permanent residents of South Africa, argued that a
revised social welfare program, which limited social welfare benefits to South
African citizens, was both contrary to the plain language of Section 27 and a
violation of the equality guarantee in Section 9. The state argued that noncitizens were not included in the language of Section 27."
The Court first found that the term "everyone" in Section 27, read
purposively, extended the right to social security to permanent residents.73 The
Court then turned to an assessment of whether exclusion on the basis of
citizenship was "reasonable" as defined in Grootboom. Here the majority
quoted the Grootboom limit on reasonableness review and stated that the Court
is not empowered to consider whether other, more favorable measures could
have been adopted."4
After establishing the scope of its review, the majority turned to the
government's argument that exclusion of permanent residents was justified for
financial reasons under Section 27(2). The majority began by noting "that
there are compelling reasons why social benefits should not be made available
to all who are in South Africa irrespective of their immigration status." 5 But
the majority found that the state's proposed exclusion of all non-citizens failed
67

Id.

68

Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S.

61

Minister of Health v TreatmentAction Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 125
(S. Aft.).
Id. at paras. 135-34.
Khosa v Minister ofSocial Development 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (S.
Aft.).
Id. at para. 58.

Afr.).
70
71
72

73

Id. at para. 47.

74

Id. at para. 48.

75

Id. at para. 58.
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to properly distinguish between permanent residents and temporary residents.
Turning to this specific subset, the majority found that the state was unable "to
furnish this Court with information relating to the numbers who hold
permanent resident status, or who would qualify for social assistance if the
citizenship barrier were to be removed."76 The Court then went on to consider
hypothetical cost increases based on the limited estimates provided by the state
and ultimately concluded that because even the largest estimate would result in
an increase of less than two percent, the state failed to show that discrimination
against permanent residents was justified for financial reasons."
In stark contrast to the majority's analysis, Justice Ngcobo in partial
dissent found that the lack of reliable information from which to estimate the
cost of extending benefits to permanent residents required deference to the
government's own conclusion that there was adequate financial justification
for the exclusion:
Policymakers have the expertise necessary to present a
reasonable prediction about future social conditions. That
is precisely the kind of work that policymakers are
supposed to do. Unless there is evidence to the contrary,
courts should be slow to reject reasonable estimates made
by policymakers.78
Justice Ncgobo's approach to the government's estimates is far more
consistent with the deference to government policy judgments expressed by the
Court in Soobramoney and Grootboom. But unlike in those cases where the
Court specifically noted that the policies were developed in good faith, the
majority in Khosa found that these judgments were the result of a flawed
process as evidenced by the government's conduct throughout the litigation.
The litigation began as two separate cases. The respondents, all
government ministers, were notified of the cases and initially indicated they
intended to oppose. 9 Despite this, the respondents neither submitted written
responses nor appeared at the scheduled hearing. As a result, the high court
entered the equivalent of a default judgment and granted the relief sought by
the plaintiffs in both cases, without issuing a written judgment."
The high court's orders were referred directly to the Constitutional
Court for confirmation as required by Section 172(2) of the Constitution.8' The
Court set a hearing date for May 13, 2003 and ordered the respondents to

Id. at para. 61.
Id. at paras. 62, 81-82.
78 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (11) BCLR
1169 (CC) at para. 128 (S. Afr.).
79 Id. at para.
6.
80Id. at paras. 6-7.
81 Id. at para. 12. Section 172(2) states in relevant part that "[a]ny
person or organ of state with a
sufficient interest may appeal, or apply, directly to the Constitutional Court to confirm or vary an order
of constitutional invalidity by a court" and also provides that "an order of constitutional invalidity has
no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court."
76
77
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provide notice of their intention to appeal and to submit briefs by May 6,
2003.82
The Court's order also requested that the respondents advise the Court
whether they intended to "mak[e] representations to the Court on the issues
raised in these directions." If not, the Court requested the Minister of Justice
and Constitutional Development, a separate government entity, "to appoint
counsel to present argument to the Court" also by May 6, 2003.83
The May 6, 2003 deadline passed with no communication from the
respondents or the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. The
Court Registrar contacted the State Attorney's Office, which represents the
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, and the State Attorney
requested until May 23 to respond! ' In a sharply worded order, the Court
refused to move the May 13 hearing date but permitted the State Attorney to
submit written arguments by May 9.5
Eventually the respondents answered the Court's initial request and
stated that they intended to oppose the order on behalf of the government.86
But they failed to submit written argument until May 12, 2003, the day before
the scheduled hearing. At the hearing, respondents argued that they needed
more time to gather data on the potential cost of the High Court's order. The
Court reluctantly granted the respondent's request for more time but expressed
its displeasure by entering a punitive costs order requiring respondents "to pay
the wasted costs of this application on the scale of attorney and own client."87
The majority noted that this unusual sanction was warranted because "[t]he
respondents were in willful default both in the High Court and in this Court
and the government also failed to comply with the directions issued by this
Court .... ",88
It is telling that the majority recounts this tale of administrative
bungling at length in its judgment.89 As in TAC, the Court never directly ties
the government's actions to its analysis of the government's policy, but in both
cases the Court clearly adopted a much less deferential role and was much
more willing to question the government's facially reasonable justifications.
Taken together, Khosa and TAC demonstrate the Court's willingness
to force the government to take its constitutional responsibilities seriously.
And when there is strong evidence the government has failed--either
deliberately, as in TAC, or through serious incompetence, as in Khosa-to
82 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) at para. 10 (S. Afr.).
83

Id. at para. 12.

84 Id. at para.

13.

85 Id. at para. 14. The relevant portion of the order, which is quoted at
length by the majority,

takes the State Attorney to task for "fail[ing] to give effect to the Chief Justice's directions" and
admonishes the attorneys to "do the best they can in the circumstances .... " Id.
86 Id. at para. 15.
87 Id. at para. 25. The South African civil justice
system requires that losers pay some but not all
of the winning party's litigation costs. The cost order here was punitive in that it required the
respondents to pay the applicants costs irrespective of the outcome and because it included additional
costs.
88 Khosa v Minister of Social Development 2004 (11) BCLR 1 t69 (CC) at para. 22 (S. Aft).
89 The majority's description of these events extends over
thirteen paragraphs in its ninety-eight
paragraph judgment.
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make policy choices through a rational and deliberate process, the Court will
take a much more direct role and give much less deference to the justifications
put forth by the government in support of its chosen policy.
III. THE DEBATE OVER THE COURT'S APPROACH

Whether the Court will continue to exercise its potential power to
impose more direct remedies as it began to do in TAC and Khosa in cases
where such direct intervention would require more complex policy choices is
still an open question. Critics of the Court's restrained approach have argued
that the government's responses to the Court's initial rulings thus far have
failed to meaningfully improve the situations they addressed." Human rights
groups have noted, for example, that the situation of the Grootboom plaintiffs
has improved minimally and that there is no clear indication of willingness on
the part of the South African government to adopt the comprehensive policies
to address housing needs required by the Court in Grootboom.9' The
government's response to the AIDS crisis has been similarly criticized as
inadequate and insufficient to meet its constitutional obligations.92
Others have argued that the Court's restrained approach in these early
cases does not go far enough in defining a specific and direct role for these
rights.93 Several critics, including David Bilchitz, have argued that the Court's
rejection of the minimum core approach in Grootboom has fostered
government intransigence9 and threatens to transform these rights into nothing
more than a requirement of reasonable government action. 95
Bilchitz contends that the Court's current context-specific
reasonableness standard is flawed for two reasons. First, the reasonableness
standard "places no clear restrictions on the [Court's] role" in socioeconomic
rights cases.96 Second, the failure to independently define the content of each

90 See, e.g., Zackie Achmat, Law, Politics, and Social
Transformation,32:2 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO.
237, 240-41 (2004) (criticizing lack of implementation of Grootboom and TAC).
91 See Mia Swart, Left Out in the Cold? Crafting Remedies for the Poorest of the Poor, 21 S.

AFR. J. HuM. RTS. 215, 216 n.6 (2005) ("According to Charlotte McClain, the Human Rights
Commissioner with responsibility for socio-economic rights, the Commission reported to the Court
about 18 months later, saying that they felt there had not been compliance with the [Grootboom]
order.").
92 See, e.g., Mark Heywood, Contempt or Compliance? The TAC Case
After the Constitutional
Court Judgment, 4 ESR REV. 1 (2003) (discussing problems in the implementation of the TAC
judgment).
93 See, e.g., Marius Pieterse, RescuscitatingSocio-Economic
Rights: ConstitutionalEntitlements
to Health Care Services, 22 S.AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 473, 474 (2006) (describing the criticisms of the
Court's approach and citing representative articles).
94 See, e.g., David Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the
Minimum Core: Laying the
Foundationsfor Future Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2003)
(arguing for the adoption of a minimum-core approach) [hereinafter Bilchitz, Reasonable Approach];
David Bilchitz, Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and Its Importance, 119 S.
AFR. L. J. 484, 484 (2002).
95 See, e.g., Marius Pieterse, Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement
of Socio-Economic
Rights, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 383 (2004).
96 Bilchitz, ReasonableApproach, supra note 94, at 10.
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right means that there is no "clear and principled basis for the evaluation of the
state's conduct by judges or other branches of government in future cases."97
Bilchitz argues that adopting a minimum-core approach will cure these
flaws by establishing a "principled basis upon which to found decisions in
socio-economic rights cases."9 Under Bilchitz's proposed approach, the Court
would first define the content of each right independent of the resources
limitation and then consider whether any shortcomings in the program at issue
are justified by the lack of sufficient resources. 9 This approach would require
the government to "realise a certain minimum level of provision without
delay" while permitting the government "to improve the level of provision
beyond this lower threshold by taking reasonable measures to meet a higher
threshold that must be attained if the right is to be fully realised.""'
Danie Brand similarly argues that the Court's present approach
discourages "future socioeconomic rights litigation" because "it provides
limited tools for the Court to deal with possible future cases (the really difficult
ones) where direct claims for the distribution of state resources are brought
before it; and it fails to set substantive standards to guide future social and
economic policy-making.""'
This is so, charges Brand, because "the
Constitutional Court has generally avoided describing the constitutionally
required ends 0 that
government must pursue with its policies in any form of
2
useful detail."'
Theunis Roux, responding to the favorable review of Grootboom by
Cass Sunstein discussed below, argues that the Court's deferential approach in
Grootboom fell far short of the expectations of public interest litigators in
South Africa.0 3 Roux argues that the Court's refusal to engage in what he
describes as "strict priority setting," which would have been possible under the
minimum-core approach the Court rejected, resulted in a lack of meaningful
relief.4 Roux further criticizes the Court's declaratory order as "a remedy
without a sanction, and therefore without any practical relevance for people
whose socio-economic rights constitute their sole claim to citizenship." "'5
By contrast, several commentators including Mark Tushnet and Cass
Sunstein have hailed the Court's approach in these initial cases as an
appropriately nuanced and balanced one that deals carefully with the core
separation of powers and institutional competence concerns that are implicated
by socioeconomic rights.' 6 Tushnet has argued that in Grootboom the Court
97

Id.

98

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 11.

99

100 Id.

101Brand, supra note 11,
at 37.
102 Id.
at 45.
103

Theunis Roux,

Understanding Grootboom-A

Response to Cass Sunstein, 12 F.

CONSTITUTIONNEL 41, 51 (2002).
104 Id. at

46-47.

JosId. at 51.
106 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 10; Tushnet, supra
note 5; see also Goldstone, supra note 10;

Kende, supra note 10. Two articles have recently been published that are also generally supportive of
the Court's approach. See Rosalind Dixon, Creating DialogueAbout Socioeconomic Rights: StrongForm Versus Weak-Form JudicialReview Revisited, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 391, 417-18 (2007) (arguing
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appropriately adopted a weaker form judicial review. Tushnet argues that
application of weak forms of judicial review may be particularly appropriate
where courts enforce socioeconomic rights because a weak-form approach
leaves considerable discretion to the other branches of government to
•
but
also in doing so to
determine not only the precise remedy in a given case,
07
develop an alternative interpretation of the right at issue.
Tushnet suggests that the Grootboom decision represents a particular
variant of weak-form review, which he describes as "democraticThis form of review offers the possibility of real
experimentalism."
enforcement of socioeconomic rights but in a way that avoids involving courts
"The democratic
in the details of complex government programs.' 8
experimentalist court acknowledges that the [constitutional] provision is open
to a range of interpretations, but concludes that the questioned practice lies
outside of any reasonable interpretation."'0 9 Instead of imposing its own
interpretation, the court "directs everyone implicated in the challenged practice
to come up with their own interpretations" and ways to implement those
interpretations." ' The court then reviews the competing interpretations and
implementations to identify those that have been more successful and directs
others to adopt those interpretations possibly altering its own interpretation as a
result. This process repeats itself resulting theoretically in a continually
improving process."'
In a similar vein, Cass Sunstein has described the Court's approach as
resembling an administrative law model of enforcement." 2 As with Tushnet,
Sunstein focuses on Grootboom as the representative example of this type of
review. He argues that the Court in Grootboom in effect adopted an approach
similar to "a subset of administrative law principles, involving judicial review
of inaction by government agencies.""' Under this approach, "any reasonable
priority-setting will be valid and perhaps even free from judicial review.""'
But where a policy decision rejects the constitutional language outright "or
that the Court should adopt a "dialogic model," which is "fully consistent with the approach that the
Court in TAC suggested might be appropriate in future cases .... "); Eric C. Christiansen,
Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional
Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 321, 324 (2007) ("[T]he Court's [socioeconomic rights]
.
jurisprudence is best understood as a viable, affirmative jurisprudence of social rights ..
107 Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1897.
108 Mark Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison Around the World, 71 TENN. L. REV. 251, 264 (2004)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Marbury]; see also Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2781 (2003); Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of
Rights- and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 813 (2003) [hereinafter Tushnet,
New Forms]; Tushnet, supra note 5. As Tushnet explains, this particular variant of weak-form review
was first described by Charles Sabel and others at Columbia Law School. See Michael C. Doff &
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution ofDemocratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
109 Tushnet, Marbury, supra note 108 at 266-67. Tushnet
emphasizes the South African cases,
including Grootboom, "do not truly exemplify-except in an extended sense-the iterative process of
democratic experimentalist adjudication." Id. at 270.
10 Id. at 267.
III Id.
112 SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at 234 ("What the South African Constitutional Court has basically
done is to adopt an administrativelaw model of socioeconomic rights.").
13 Id. at
235.
114

Id.
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does not take [constitutional] goals sufficiently seriously, [it] will be held
invalid."''5
In Sunstein's view, this deferential approach gives an appropriately
limited effect to socioeconomic rights by "strengthen[ing] the hand of those
who might be unable to make much progress in the political arena ...."" At
the same time, by deferring to reasonable priority setting by the government,
such an approach respects "democratic prerogatives and the simple fact of
limited budgets.""'
IV. THE PROMISE OF POLICENTRIC REVIEW
The Constitutional Court has consistently stated that courts have the
power to take a more direct role in the enforcement of the Constitution's
socioeconomic rights. And the Court itself has moved toward a more direct
role in cases where the government has obviously failed to take seriously its
responsibilities under these rights.
More importantly, lower courts have at least in part begun to evolve
towards more direct remedies as they struggle to apply the principles the Court
has established in these early cases. While the Constitutional Court's two most
recent opinions sidestep the opportunity to affirm directly the appropriateness
of this evolution, the Court has given indications in these cases that it considers
stronger remedies appropriate in certain circumstances. The Court's most
recent judgment and the partial settlement that preceded it also offer the
strongest evidence yet that the Court's approach may be starting to work in
South Africa.
This shift towards a stronger form of review and more direct remedies
in second order cases is important because it provides at least a partial answer
to the central criticism that the Court's restrained approach to enforcement of
socioeconomic rights threatens to make it no more than hortatory. At the same
time, the more direct role that lower courts have been willing to take in these
cases also requires revision of the restrained accounts that Tushnet and
Sunstein have described the Court as taking when enforcing these rights.
When these second order cases are taken into account, the
Constitutional Court has begun to develop what can best be described as a
policentric form of review. I borrow the concept of "policentric" review from
Reva Siegel and Robert Post's article, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, which advocates for a policentric approach to interpretation of
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution."8 Siegel and
Post deliberately spell the term with an "i" to distinguish it from Lon Fuller's
famous concept of a "polycentric" dispute, i.e., a dispute that implicates
overlapping and interrelated policy choices." 9 By "policentric" Siegel and Post
115

Id.

116

Id.

17

Id. at 236.

118 Post
119

& Siegel, supra note 12.
See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
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instead mean that courts share interpretive authority with another branch of
government-in the case of Section 5, the legislative branch.
Although Post and Siegel specifically proposed adopting such a model
for interpretation of Section 5, the model they outline-and the benefits they
ascribe to it-also fits aspects of the approach the Constitutional Court is
developing in the socioeconomic rights area. As Post and Siegel describe it,
the policentric model requires that "the Constitution should be regarded as
having multiple interpreters, both political and legal."' 2 ° As a result, the other
branches of government do not violate the separation of powers principle when
they pass legislation or develop policies that depend on an interpretation of the
constitution that differs from that of the courts. At the same time, however,
courts are not bound by the competing interpretation presented by the
legislature or executive."'
This approach has several distinct advantages over the traditional
juricentric interpretive model. As an initial matter, the policentric model better
reflects the reality of constitutional practice. As Post and Siegel describe it,
constitutional meaning is constantly subject to multiple interpretations both
judicial and non-judicial that compete in an "ongoing cultural struggle.""'
Judicial interpretations are plainly a part of this struggle and indeed often serve
as the catalyst for non-judicial responses that resist judicial interpretations. '23
But non-judicial interpretations also form an important part in the development
of constitutional norms.
A. Benefits of PolicentricReview in Socioeconomic Rights Context
Once courts recognize that non-judicial interpretations of a
constitution do not necessarily violate the separation of powers principle but
instead play a beneficial role in constitutional development, the question
becomes how courts should treat such interpretations. 2 ' As the South African
Constitutional Court's current approach appears to recognize, socioeconomic
rights present an area in which it is particularly appropriate to give equal force
to legislative and executive judgments about constitutional meaning. In the
Section 5 context, Post and Siegel argue that the legislative branch is
"especially well-situated to respond to changes in constitutional culture" and
therefore that historically "Congress' ability to deploy its Section 5 power to
translate [developing popular] ideas [about sex equality] into constitutional

120
121

Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 1947.
Id.

M Id. at 2029 (quoting Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial ConstitutionalInterpretation:
Three
Objectionsand Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 848 (2002)).
123 See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage:
Democratic Constitutionalism and

Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 373 (2007) (discussing conservative "backlash" to the Roe
decision and its effect on the extra-judicial development of constitutional norms).
124 Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 2028 (quoting Whittington,
supra note 122 ("Once we
recognize that extrajudicial constitutional interpretation can coexist with judicial review, then the
normative case for and against extrajudicial constitutional interpretation primarily goes to the question
")).
of how much deference the judiciary should show to other political actors ....
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terms proved helpful and instructive to the Court's efforts to grapple with the
question of gender."'25
1. InstitutionalCompetence and DemocraticLegitimacy
The comparative institutional advantage of the legislature and
executive branches is even more important in the socioeconomic rights area
where the issues relate not to relatively long-term changes in culture but to
short-term and often dramatic changes in government resources and policy
priorities. By extending coextensive authority to the other branches of
government to interpret these provisions, the Constitutional Court can take full
advantage of their ability to deal with these changes in real-time without
waiting for the Court.
At the same time, extending interpretive authority to the other
branches also enhances the democratic basis for making those policy tradeoffs.
In this respect, courts operating in a policentric mode of review assume the
' 26
role of what Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm have termed "catalysts." '
According to Scott and Sturm, "[f]aw thus operates as a catalyst by facilitating
the elaboration and implementation of public law norms by other actors, and
the productive engagement of normative inquiry among relevant institutional
actors including the judiciary itself."'27 Rather than merely displacing or
affirming legislative and executive decisions regarding socioeconomic rights,
courts instead require clear articulation of the basis for those decisions and a
forum for inquiry into the effects of those decisions in light of competing
interpretations. This process will sometimes, as in Groothoom, result in forced
reconsideration of an initial interpretation or even, as in TAC, a court dictated
change. But even in cases where a court has the final word, the interpretation
that results is contingent and thus subject to revision by the legislative and
executive branches.
2. Robust Enforcement
In addition to the practical and democracy enhancing benefits the
Court derives from recognizing coextensive interpretive authority in the
coordinate branches of government, this approach also enhances the possibility
for robust enforcement of the socioeconomic rights guarantees. Post and
Siegel argue that a policentric approach to constitutional interpretation of
Section 5 "enable[s] Congress to articulate constitutional aspirations in a
manner that consolidates constitutional values, and hence that enhances the
likelihood that judicial interpretations of the Constitution will receive the
political allegiance that is frequently necessary for their full legitimization."' 28
In a similar fashion, policentric review also enhances the possibility that the
125

Id. at 2030-3 1.

126

Joanne Scott & Susan P. Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial
Role in New

Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565 (2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=98228 1.
127 Id. at 566.
128 Post & Siegel, supra
note 12, at 2032.
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other branches will be more willing to enforce court orders because they have a
direct role in the interpretive process and therefore are more likely to view the
outcome as legitimate. This is reinforced by the Court's recognition in TAC
that the executive and legislature have both the power and responsibility to
determine if and when a change in circumstances warrants a departure from a
particular method of enforcement chosen by the court.
By engaging the South African government in the interpretive process
and by respecting its interpretations where appropriate, the Constitutional
Court has begun to develop a relationship in which it expects the government
to take the lead in enforcing socioeconomic rights. This is far more effective
than establishing an antagonistic relationship in which the government waits
for specific court instruction and is unwilling to go beyond the bare minimum
required by those specific orders. Also by giving the government broad
responsibility to enforce the Court's orders rather than engaging immediately
in direct oversight of the government's efforts, the Court is working to develop
the political will necessary for implementation of these rights.
Another important component of this approach-and one that arguably
departs in significant ways from Post and Siegel's model-is the Court's
emphasis on civil society involvement with government to ensure that these
rights are implemented. In combination with the Court's emphasis on the
responsibility of government to take the lead in enforcing these rights, this
emphasis on civil society as an equal partner creates a much greater potential
for meaningful enforcement than would a traditional court-centered model of
enforcement.
Heywood's account of the TAC litigation illustrates the important role
that civil society can play in this process. In that case, the litigation itself was
one part of a multifaceted strategy to pressure the government to respond not
only to the specific problem of mother-to-child transmission of HIV but to the
broader AIDS crisis.'29 Heywood and others describe the litigation victory in
TAC as "simply the conclusion of a battle that TAC had already won outside
the courts."'3" And Zackie Achmat, one of the leaders of TAC, has emphasized
that social mobilization has been the motivating force in enforcing the TAC
judgment.

3'

As discussed in Part IV, post-Grootboom no similar high profile
organizational effort has developed around the right to housing. But there are
signs that a TAC-like movement is emerging led by the efforts of the Center

129

Heywood, supra note 56, at 300 ("For TAC, litigation both emerges from and feeds back into

a social context. Resort to litigation is not exclusive of other strategies. Litigation can also help to
catalyse mobilisation and assist public education on contested issues, as well as to bring about direct
relief to individuals or classes of applicants. Thus, between August and December 2001, TAC
engaged in intensive public mobilisation, attracting enormous support and media interest." (citing
Mark Heywood, Debunking Conglomo-Talk: A Case Study of the Amicus CuriaeAs an Instrumentfor
Advocacy, Investigation and Mobilisation, 5 LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEV. 133 (2001)).
130 Id. at 314 (quoting Geoff Budlender, A PaperDog With Real Teeth, MAIL & GUARDIAN, July
12, 2002).
131 Zackie Achmat, Law, Politics, and Social Transformation, 32
INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 237, 240
(2004) ("The judgment in favor of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAG) in its legal battle to prevent
HLV transmission from mother-to-child is only being enforced because of social mobilization.")
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for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) and others.' 2 Full implementation of
Grootboom will depend in large part on the continued ability of groups like
CALS to mobilize political support while simultaneously putting pressure on
government at all levels through targeted litigation.
The Court's focus on government responsibility and civil society
cooperation are particularly important given the relative youth of the
Constitutional Court as an institution and the still developing relationship
between the Court and the government. The Court was an innovation created
by the 1993 Interim Constitution. Prior to the Interim Constitution, South
Africa followed a slightly modified version of parliamentary sovereignty in
which courts had limited powers to review legislation.'33 During the apartheid
era the South African Parliament consolidated power even further with the
legislature and executive and worked to severely limit the power of courts to
constrain government action."4
As noted above, both the interim Constitution and the 1996
Constitution firmly establish judicial review, but the Court is still working to
develop what that means in South Africa and must tread carefully in the
process.'35 TAC is an excellent example of the risks the Court faces. As noted
above, the Court rejected calls by the plaintiffs and others to retain jurisdiction,
carefully noting that "[t]he government has always respected and executed
orders of this Court. There is no reason to believe that it will not do so in the
present case."'3 6 In fact, during the course of the litigation the South African
Health Minister had gone on record suggesting that the government might
resist court intervention.' The Court of course called the Minister's bluff but
did so in the context of refusing to issue the much more intrusive remedy of a
structural injunction. That careful result allowed the Court to assert its
authority without risking direct resistance. At the same time, it encouraged
and allowed the government to demonstrate its commitment to the rule of law
through voluntary compliance.
At a more basic level, the post-apartheid government has faced serious
challenges developing the bureaucratic and administrative capacity to govern
effectively. The bureaucratic breakdown in Khosa illustrates these practical
132

See infra text accompanying notes 186-94.

133

See J.D. van der Vyver, Depriving Westminster of Its Moral Constraints: A Survey of

ConstitutionalDevelopment in South Africa, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 291 (1985).
134 Id. at 307 ("The [South African] legislature's
departure [during the apartheid

era] from its
historical purpose, coupled with the absence of real democratic surveillance, not only resulted in
discriminatory allocation of statutory competencies, rights, and duties on the basis of color, but also
transformed parliamentary sovereignty into legislative anarchy.").
135 Mark Kende notes that the ANC also was ambivalent
about establishing a strong judiciary
during the constitutional negotiations and before. See Kende, supra note 10, at 626-28; see also Albie
Sachs, South Africa s Unconstitutional Constitution: The Transitionfrom Power to Lawful Power, 41
ST. Louis U. L.J. 1249 (describing the ANC's internal debate over whether to include a judicially
enforceable Bill of Rights in the post-apartheid constitution).
136 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 129 (S. Afr.).
137 See Heywood, supra note 56, at 308-09. Heywood
further notes that the ANC Youth League
issued a statement calling on the government not to comply with the lower court order in TAC because
"judges are not elected to govern the country; they are not qualified to make political decisions about
government not to mention prescribing policies to the people's government." Id. at 309 (quoting
African National Congress Youth League, Statement on the Order to Provide Nevirapine (March 26,
2002), http://www.anc.org.za/youth/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2009)).
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challenges and the difficulties that can arise even with an otherwise wellintentioned government. The Court's emphasis on civil society partnerships is
an important mechanism for ameliorating these problems.
B. Responding to the Court's Critics

In contrast to policentric review, the minimum-core approach proposed
by Bilchitz and other critics of the Court would eliminate many of these
benefits and is inconsistent with the flexible conception of separation of
powers that the Court has begun to develop in these early cases and which is
the defining characteristic of a policentric approach. The Court has repeatedly
insisted that "there are no bright lines that separate the roles of the legislature,
the executive and the courts from one another . ..

."'

On the one hand, that

flexible understanding is the basis for the Court's assertion that courts have the
power to make orders that affect government policies directly.'39 But that
flexibility cuts both ways and also permits the executive and legislative
branches to have a role in interpreting the extent of their obligations under the
Constitution.
This is perhaps the most significant flaw in the minimum-core critique.
The assertion that the Court's current approach leaves the government "with an
amorphous standard with which to judge its own conduct" is precisely the
point. 40
The Court specifically intends for the government to take
responsibility for defining its own obligations under the socioeconomic rights
provisions because the government is in a better position than the courts to do
so. This does not mean that the courts are powerless to review the
government's own interpretation or to order specific changes where necessary.
TAC and Khosa clearly demonstrate that the precise opposite is true: Where
the government acts inconsistently with its own interpretation of a given right
as in TAC or where its interpretation is merely incorrect as in Khosa, the Court
has the power to step in and order a change in policy.
The minimum-core approach instead places the Court in the familiar
position of the sole arbiter of constitutional meaning and thereby eliminates the
distinct advantages of the Court's much more flexible understanding of
separation of powers.
Under this traditional juricentric model where
implementation of a constitutional right is at issue, the government requires a
definitive interpretation of a particular right to guide its own policy judgments.
But if the Court must fix the specific content of each right before the
government has had a chance to act, it deprives the coordinate branches of
government from exercising independent interpretive authority and also
deprives the Court of the benefit of that independent-and better informedinterpretation.
The Court's early cases demonstrate the potential of this approach. In
Soobramoney, the Court found the government's own interpretation of what
Minister ofHealth v TreatmentAction Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 98 (S.
Aft.).
See, e.g., id.
140 Bilchitz, supra note
11, at 10.
138
139
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Section 27 required in the context of dialysis treatment to be reasonable and
the government's chosen program to be consistent with that interpretation. In
Grootboom, the Court likewise found the government's interpretation of the
right to housing to be reasonable, but at the same time the Court found that the
government's chosen program failed to fulfill that interpretation in one critical
respect: the immediate needs of people in crisis.
Rather than tie the government's hands by establishing the specific
policies required to address this gap, the Court left it to the government to do
so. Roux takes the Court to task for this limited order asserting that "[t]he
closest the Court came to giving its [declaratory] order teeth was the
observation that the South African Human Rights Commission was under a
constitutional duty to monitor the promotion of socioeconomic rights and
would, thus, 'if necessary ... report on the efforts made by the State to comply
with its Section 26 obligations in accordance with this judgment.""'
According to Roux, the Court severely undercut the potential effectiveness of
the Section 26 housing right by limiting itself to a declaratory remedy that "has
embarrassment value only."'42 In Roux's view, the Court should have ordered
much more direct relief including directing the relevant state agencies to
present the Court with a specific plan for correcting the constitutional
violation. 141
But as with Bilchitz's call for a minimum-core approach, Roux's
critique fails to appreciate the benefits that the Court's deferral to the
government can potentially produce. Faced with a declaration of invalidity but
without a specific order as to how to remedy that violation beyond the general
command to include the homeless communities that its existing plan leaves
out, the government has the freedom to interpret the content of the right to
housing as it deems appropriate. This does not mean that as Roux argues the
Court's order lacks teeth because as I argue in more detail in the following
Subpart the Court retains the power to review the government's own
interpretation in a later case.'" But it does place the onus on the government to
determine for itself what its responsibilities are. This creates a stronger
incentive for the government to act in good faith to implement its own
understanding of what the right to housing requires than would a more specific
remedy imposed and enforced directly by the Court.
Nor does the lack of immediate judicial review mean as Roux asserts
that this is "a remedy without a sanction."'4 5 To the contrary, the most
immediate potential sanction for a failure by the government to address the
violation in Grootboom is a political one. Roux dismisses this as having
"embarrassment value only,"'' 4 6 but read together with the power reserved in
TAC to impose more direct remedies in the face of failure by government to
141 Roux, supra note 103, at 51 (quoting
Government of the Republic of South Africa v
Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at para. 97 (S. Afr.)).
142 Id.
143

Id. (quoting Wim Trengrove, JudicialRemedies for , olations of Socio-Economic
Rights, I

ESR REv. 8,10 (1999)).
144 See infra
Part IV.
145 Roux, supra note
103, at 51.
146 Id.
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respond to this weak remedy the Grootboom order looks much more like an
appropriately nuanced response to a good faith effort by the government to
comply with its Section 26 obligations. This combination of an initial weak
remedy with the possibility of a future strong one is potentially much more
effective in prodding the government to make meaningful policy changes than
imposing a strong remedy in the first instance. And as the Court itself noted
(and Roux acknowledges dismissively), other non-judicial actors like the South
African Human Rights Commission can help ensure that the necessary political
pressure to make such changes (backed by the threat of future litigation) will in
fact materialize.
The important point here is that by refusing to retain jurisdiction over
the government's response the Court is recognizing that effective change is
only possible over time and where the incentives are principally political rather
than legal. The Court's weak remedy thus recognizes the political complexity
involved in crafting a meaningful response to the need for emergency shelter
and attempts to deal with that complexity by creating the right incentives for
political change. By refusing to dictate the precise terms of that policy or even
immediately to review the government's proposed response in the short term,
the Court is both giving the government the time necessary to deal with such a
complex problem and placing responsibility squarely on the legislature and
executive to come up with their own constitutionally sufficient solutions rather
than merely deferring to the Court's judgment.
Second, and more importantly, by emphasizing the need for elements
of civil society to work with the government to ensure that these programs
materialize, the Court is trying to emphasize the need for a political solution to
enforcement. Had the Court retained jurisdiction to review a revised housing
plan, that would transformed the broader-and potentially much more
effective-process of trying to develop a political response to this problem into
a much narrower process of coming up with a legal response. To be sure that
legal response would have come much faster than a political
response but
4 7
likely at the cost of being much less effective in the long term."
TAC and Khosa illustrate the flexibility of a policentric approach in
particular the ability and willingness of the Court to take an even more direct
role while still retaining a significant interpretive role for the government
where the government has been unwilling or unable to take seriously its
constitutional responsibilities. As noted above, in TAC the Court determined
that the reasons the government put forth for refusing to expand the nevirapine
program directly contradicted its own policy decision that administration of
147 Notably, the Court has placed even greater
emphasis on the need for cooperation between
civil society and government when interpreting Section 26(3), which prohibits evictions without a
court order that considers "all the relevant circumstances," and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE), which implements that requirement by prohibiting
evictions of unlawful occupiers unless a court determines the eviction is "just and equitable."
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 s. 4(7). In Port
Elizabeth, the Constitutional Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the
question whether the Court could or should order mediation under the PIE. See Port Elizabeth
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) at para. 44 (S. Afr.). The Court observed that
"absent special circumstances, it would not ordinarily be just and equitable to order eviction if proper
discussions, and where appropriate, mediation, have not been attempted." Id. at para. 43.
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nevirapine was the most effective and safest method for preventing mother-tochild transmission of HIV."4 In that situation unlike in Grootboom, the Court
was willing to take a more direct role in developing specific policies but only
as a means of implementing the government's own determination that
administration of nevirapine was the best approach to this particular social
problem. In this way the Court was able to take a direct role to fill the gap that
the government's recalcitrance had created but at the same time to still avoid
the problems that were likely to arise by engaging in extensive court directed
policy making.
Significantly even in a case where the Court took this more direct role,
it was careful to create flexibility for the government in complying with its
order and also to preserve the independent interpretive authority of the
government. In a rhetorical move reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court's
Marbury v. Madison4 decision, the Court paired its strong statements about
the extensive range of its remedial powers with a refusal to invoke the full
range of those powers.'5 ° Instead the Court made a point of stating that the
government has always complied with its decisions in the past and that there
was no reason to expect a different result in TAC.'5'
More importantly the Court at the same time acknowledged the power
of the executive branch to disregard the specifics of the Court's order
regarding implementation: "Government must retain the right to adapt the
policy, consistent with its constitutional obligations, should it consider it
appropriate to do so."' ' 2 Thus, even in the context of ordering the government
to make specific programmatic changes based on the Court's interpretation of
Section 27, the Court gave back to the government the ability to reinterpret its
obligations under that right should circumstances warrant it. This creates
incentives for the government to take its role seriously in the future and to
develop programs that meet its obligations under the socioeconomic rights
provisions. It also establishes the necessary flexibility for ensuring that
government programs are able to adapt to the changing needs of South African
society.
Likewise in Khosa the Court was responding to a combination of
administrative incompetence-represented by the complete failure of the
relevant administrative agencies to meaningfully respond to the litigation-and
the weight of intersecting constitutional violations: the right to social security
in Section 27 and the right to equality in Section 9.
Under those
circumstances, it was relatively easy for the Court to justify moving towards
the stronger end of the enforcement continuum by rewriting the social security
legislation to cover permanent residents.
Given this potential to move along a spectrum of responses, a
policentric approach involves at least the possibility for a more direct judicial
role than the weak-form review Tushnet ascribes to Grootboom. This form of
148

Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 62 (S. Afr.).

149 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
150

Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 129 (S. Afr.).

151Id.
152

Id. at para. 127.
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review is too limited in that it implies that the Court can never take a direct
role whereas in policentric review the Court's role operates on a continuum
that allows for a range of relatively weaker and stronger interventions. For
example, while citing Grootboom as an effective example of weak review,
Tushnet suggests that the stronger remedy in TAC represents a return to strongform review and a potential loss of those benefits.'53 TAC no doubt is an
example of the Court operating in a stronger mode than in Grootboom. But the
Court still preserved a coextensive role for the executive branch in two ways.
First, the Court accepted the government's own interpretation of what the
constitution required, i.e., single-dose nevirapine was the most effective
program to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV-AIDS.
More
importantly, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that the government
could depart from its order and adopt an alternative policy for addressing
mother-to-child transmission. In other words, the Court told the government
that while its specific implementation of the nevirapine program here fell short,
the government was still free to develop an entirely different program to
implement the healthcare right. The Court also refused to retain jurisdiction to
ensure compliance with its order. In a traditional strong-form role such
remedial flexibility would be impossible. But a modified policentric approach
permits precisely the kind of give and take between the Court and the
government in which at different times each side takes the lead in interpreting
and reinterpreting each right. The Court's direct remedy in TAC was thus less
a fixed articulation of what the right to health care requires than a signal
intended to shape the government's own interpretations in later cases.
Tushnet more recently has suggested that it might be appropriate for
weak-form review to evolve over time into strong-form but only after the
iterative process described above has run its course resulting in a relatively
stable consensus over the meaning of a particular constitutional provision. '
Strong-form review would only develop once the courts had obtained the full
benefits of weak-form experimentation and "the accumulated force of weakform decisions [can] provide[] the basis for replacing that form with strongform review.""'
153 See, Tushnet, New Forms, supra note 108,
at 825-27; see also Tushnet, Marbury, supra note
108, at 273 (In TAC "the Court abjured the course it had taken in Grootboom of asking only for a plan
that it could then review and, instead, directly imposed a significant regulatory requirement.").
Tushnet alternatively hypothesizes that the political circumstances surrounding the TAC litigation may
mean that it will be assimilated as an anomalous example of strong-form review in the socioeconomic
rights context: "Perhaps the culture will take as more important the unusual circumstances of the
nevirapine case, treat the case as a sport, and give judicial review a weak form again." Tushnet, New
Forms,supra note 108, at 827. I agree with Tushnet's conclusion that the unusual politics of the case
explains to a large degree the Court's more searching approach and willingness to impose a direct
remedy. But, rather than viewing this result as an aberration, I think it is consistent with the flexibility
that a modified policentric approach creates for the Court to evolve towards stronger remedies in
specific circumstances. Cf Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 2025 (emphasizing that "[c]ourts remain
free [under a policentric approach] to strike down Section 5 legislation that violates judicially
enforceable rights or that impermissibly infringes other constitutional values like federalism.").
154 Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Review and "Core
" Civil Liberties, 41 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
17 (2006) (discussing the possibility of drawing a distinction between strong-form and weak-form
review "within the domain of fundamental rights" and "suggesting that strong-form review is most
defensible with respect to problems the courts have grappled with over many years.").
155 Id.
at 20.
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The flexibility to move towards strong-form review that is
characteristic of the Court's version of policentric review is very different from
the evolution into strong-form through accumulated experience that Tushnet
describes. In the socioeconomic rights context, the Court would prefer never
to reach a point where it regularly engages in strong-form review. But it
retains the option for stronger intervention to ensure that the government takes
its role seriously. The decision to move towards a stronger mode thus will
always depend on the particular circumstances of each case and will be the
exception rather than the norm.
In this respect, the Court's default approach mirrors to a large extent
the range of weak remedial forms described by Tushnet. It is pragmatic,
consultative, and contingent. The Court responds to the particular challenges
of each case before it and can deploy relatively weaker or stronger remedies as
circumstances require." 6 The principal difference is that the Court retains the
ability to impose strong remedies in appropriate circumstances.' 7
Sunstein's description of the Court's approach as an administrative law
model while a largely accurate description of the Court's default approach fails
to capture the full range of approaches the Court has reserved to itself. The
administrative law model implies that the Court will always defer to the
government's justifications and will only offer its own interpretation where the
government has clearly acted in violation of the constitutional standard. By
locking the Court into a deferential mode of review, this account ignores the
Court's consistent statements that it will not always defer to the government's
policy judgments when enforcing these rights. Thus, even in Grootboom, the
Court emphasized that the socioeconomic rights provisions are like every other
right contained in the Bill of Rights in that "the courts are constitutionally
bound to ensure that they are protected and fulfilled."'' 8 The Court restated its
role in even stronger terms at the close of the opinion: "I stress however, that
despite all these [internal] qualifications, these are rights, and the Constitution
obliges the state to give effect to them. This is an obligation that courts can,
and in appropriate circumstances, must enforce."'' 9
The Court's willingness to take a much more direct role in TAC and
Khosa confirm that Court views its role as potentially much more robust than
the limited review for arbitrariness that is characteristic of administrative law.
For example, when reviewing agency actions a court is required to accept the
findings and conclusions of the agency and questions of fact as prima facie true
and correct. ' But inboth TAC and Khosa, the Court demonstrated that it will
not defer in all cases to facially reasonable conclusions by the government
where there is reason to suspect those conclusions. More importantly, the
156 See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 248 (describing
a range of weak remedies and noting the
flexibility of courts to alter those remedies in response to both plaintiffs and government officials).
157 Cf id. at 252-54 (describing the possible benefits and challenges of "a strategy of writing

strong social welfare rights into the constitution but enforcing them only through weak remedies."
(emphasis added)).
158 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at
para. 20 (S. Afr.).
159Id. at para.
94.
160 See, e.g., Kaufman v. State Dep't of Soc. & Rehabilitative
Servs., 811 P.2d 876, 883 (Kan.
1991); Toys R Us v. Silva, 676 N.E.2d 862, 867 (N.Y. 1996).
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deference required under an administrative law model is inconsistent with the
power the Court has reserved to evolve towards an even stronger role in later
cases where the government has initially failed to respond adequately to a
declaration of unconstitutionality.
V.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND SECOND ORDER CASES

The effectiveness of the Court's policentric approach over the long
term depends in large part on two things. First, the space the Court has created
must in fact result in mobilization by civil society to create political pressure
for meaningful policy changes. Second, courts at all levels must be willing to
exercise the more direct role the Constitutional Court has consistently
preserved particularly in cases where political pressure by itself has been
insufficient to prompt meaningful policy changes by the government.
The results thus far have been mixed. The government entities
responsible for implementing the Court's early decisions have responded
slowly often with limited results. But there are promising signs at least in the
housing area that some of the elements necessary for effective implementation
of these rights are beginning to develop. In a series of second order cases in
the housing area, a range of public interest organizations are beginning to put
more consistent pressure on government entities to implement the Grootboom
decision, and the high courts have been increasingly willing to intervene
directly in cases brought by these groups. Two of these cases have made their
way up to the Constitutional Court. While managing to avoid directly
addressing these developments, the Court has signaled some support for the
use of stronger interventions while remaining committed to pushing the
question of enforcement back into the political arena.
A. Evolution Towards Strong-Form Review in the High Courts

The Cape High Court in two separate cases found that the City of Cape
Town failed to comply with the Constitutional Court's order in Grootboom
because the City's housing program still failed to provide for the short-term
needs of its homeless population. 6 ' In the most telling example, Rudolph, the
City of Cape Town brought an action to evict multiple individuals who
occupied shacks in Valhalla Park, a public park in Cape Town. The City
argued that the provisions of legislation'62 regulating the rights of landowners
and illegal occupiers did not apply or in the alternative that the City was
entitled to urgent interim relief as provided for in that legislation.'63 The
161 See City of Cape Town v Rudolph & Others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C) (S. Afr.), No.
8970/01, 2003

SACLR LEXIS 43; In the Matter Between the City of Cape Town & The Various Occupiers of the
RoadReserve ofAppellant Parallelto the Sheffield Road in Phillipi,No. A 5/2003 (Sept. 30, 2003) (S.
Afr.).
162 The legislation at issue was the Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and
Unlawful Occupation
of Land Act 19 of 1998.
163 See City of Cape Town v Rudolph & Others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C) (S. Aft.), No. 8970/01, 2003
SACLR LEXIS 43, at * 14.
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residents responded with a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the City had
failed to meet its obligations under Section 26(2) of the Constitution as
interpreted in Grootboom to make short-term provision for crisis situations like
that of the Valhalla Park residents.'"' The residents further sought an order
barring their eviction and requiring the City to deliver a report detailing the
steps it had taken to comply with its constitutional obligations.'6
The court first denied the City's request for an eviction order finding
that the PIE applied and prevented summary eviction under these
circumstances.' 6 The court also rejected the City's argument that application
of the PIE to prevent eviction was an arbitrary deprivation of property and thus
that the provisions violated Section 26 of the Constitution. Significantly, the
court's rejection of the City's argument drew, in part, on Grootboom's
interpretation of Section 26(3). The court cited Grootboom's articulation of
the negative dimension of 26(3) to support its conclusion that the legislature
had an obligation to pass legislation like the PIE in order to fulfill its
constitutional duty to prevent impairment of individual rights by third parties.'67
The court then turned to the counterclaim and, after quoting
Grootboom at length, phrased the issue as whether "two and a half years after
the judgment in the Grootboom case ... the applicant has complied with its
constitutional duties as declared by the Constitutional Court - and if not, what
should be the appropriate remedy."'68 The court noted that one of the
defendants in Grootboom, the Cape Metropolitan Council, which since had
merged with the City, presented a plan for the rapid release of land for families
in crisis in the Grootboom case.'69 But the court found that the City had failed
to implement that plan or to give any indication that it planned to do so.
Finally, the court noted that the housing backlog in the Cape area at the time
Grootboom was decided was 206,000 houses but that instead of decreasing that
backlog had increased to 250,000 and continued to grow at a rate of 15,000
houses per year. ,'
Turning to remedies, the court quoted the Constitutional Court's
statement in TAC that courts in the appropriate circumstances have the power
to issue a mandamus order requiring the government to report back on progress
to remedy the breach.'
The court found that the City's "attitude of denial"
and failure to comply with Grootboom warranted an order requiring the City to
report back to the court within four months on its progress in implementing a
plan for emergency housing."'

164 Id. at
165

*16-20.
Id. at *21.

166 Id. at *46, 65-69.
167

168

Id.
Id. at *97.

169 Id. at * 104-05 (citing Government of the Republic of South Africa
v Grootboom 2000 (11)

BCLR 1169 (CC) at paras. 60, 67 (S. Afr.)).
170 Id. at *111.
171 Id.
at * 120-22 (quoting Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721
(CC) at para. 129 (S. Afr.)).
172 Id. at *121.
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Thus, the Cape High Court in Rudolph was willing to invoke the
oversight power that the Constitutional Court stated was available to courts but
refused to exercise in TAC. Rudolph is part of an apparent trend in which the
High Courts in certain cases have been willing to deploy the more direct
remedies outlined by the Constitutional Court in its early cases. In another
eviction case, the Cape High Court in Phillipi affirmed an order by the
magistrate court refusing to permit the City of Cape Town to evict residents of
an informal settlement until the City offered alternative accommodation. After
quoting Grootboom at length, the court took the City of Cape Town to task for
failing to show "what measures it has taken to provide some form of relief 'for
people in desperate need' such as respondents."'
The court found that the
City "has in fact adopted an attitude ... that it is not under any obligation to
provide such relief for respondents." On this basis, the court upheld the
magistrate's determination that the City could not proceed with evicting the
residents until it had implemented Grootboom's command to develop a plan
for accommodating the residents.'7 4
Phillipi, like Rudolph, demonstrates the willingness of lower courts to
hold the government accountable in second order cases for implementing
declaratory orders by the Constitutional Court.
More recently, the
Johannesburg High Court joined this trend in a slightly different fashion. In
the Matter Between Lingwood and the Unlawful Occupiers of RYE of ERF 9
Highlands'75 dealt with an application by the purchasers of an apartment
building in Johannesburg to evict the occupants most of whom had resided in
the building for several years. The application was brought under the PIE, and
the residents argued that an eviction order would not be "just and equitable" as
required by the PIE'76 because there were no alternative accommodations
available in Johannesburg.'"
The residents also sought a stay of the
proceeding until applicants joined the City of Johannesburg and a declaration
that the City was constitutionally required to provide temporary emergency
shelter for individuals like themselves who would have no alternative
accommodations if evicted.'
The High Court noted that the City had been served with the original
eviction application as required under the PIE, and it had filed a form notice
stating that it "does not have any land and/or alternative suitable
accommodation available to accommodate the respondents."'7 9
The court
found that this "terse and unsubstantiated statement. .. does not at all comply"

173 In the Matter Between the City of Cape Town & The
Various Occupiers of the Road Reserve
of Appellant Parallelto the Sheffield Road in Phillipi,No. A 5/2003, slip op. at para. 25 (SCA Sept.

30, 2003) (S. Aft.).
174 Id. at paras.
25-26.
175In the Matter Between Lingwood and the Unlawful Occupiers of RIE of
ERF 9 Highlands,

No. 2006/16243 (October 16, 2007) (S. Aft.).
P6 Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 s. 4(7).

177In the Matter Between Lingwood and the Unlawful Occupiers of RIE
of ERF 9 Highlands,

No. 2006/16243, slip op. at para. 7 (SCA October 16, 2007) (S. Afr.).
I Id. at para. 12.
179

Id. atpara. 15.
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with the City's obligations under Section 26 and related legislation.' 0 After
surveying a range of similar cases including the High Court orders in the City
of Johannesburg and Modderklip cases discussed below, the court found that
the City was "a necessary and interested party" because of its constitutional
and statutory obligations to provide shelter following an eviction and therefore
that the residents should be permitted to join the City before the application
proceeded. "'
Relying heavily on the Constitutional Court's discussion of mediation
in the Port Elizabeth case,' 2 the court also held that whether the parties had
engaged in mediation prior to the eviction proceeding was a relevant
consideration in deciding if an eviction order would be just and equitable under
the PIE.' 3 After noting that High Courts often issue "innovative orders" in PIE
cases, the court then stayed the application, ordered the respondents to join the
City, and directed all of the parties "to engage in mediation in an endeavor to
explor[e] all possibilities of securing suitable alternative accommodation or
land and/or achieving solutions mutually acceptable to the parties."' 4
While less of a direct enforcement of Grootboom than Rudolph and
Phillipi, the order in Lingwood represents a creative extension of the
Grootboom requirement to address emergency needs that is potentially much
broader. If the reasoning in Lingwood is adopted by other courts, it will permit
individuals faced with homelessness from a potential eviction order to join the
relevant government entity to be a party to every private eviction proceeding.
It will also put in the forefront the question of whether the government has met
its obligation under Grootboom to develop and implement a plan for providing
emergency shelter will be relevant-and perhaps dispositive-in determining
whether an eviction order is just and equitable. The net effect will be to create
a close nexus between the right of private parties to evict and the success of the
government in developing emergency shelter programs as required by
Grootboom.
At the same time that Lingwood extends the effect of Grootboom in
ways that put increased pressure on the government to meet its obligations
under Section 26, it is also largely consistent with the Constitutional Court's
preference for promoting political resolution to socioeconomic rights issues for
two reasons. First, rather than direct a specific policy outcome, Lingwood
creates pressure by forcing the government to defend its policy decisions in a
category of cases where it would otherwise not have been directly involved
and in which both sides of the dispute-the landowner seeking to evict and the
residents-will have a mutual interest in pressuring the government to fulfill
its obligations to provide emergency housing. While most immediate in the
context of a pending eviction proceeding, the leverage created by this
mechanism also operates outside of litigation because the government now
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at para.
37.
182 See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various
Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (S.Aft.).
183 In the Matter Between Lingwood and the
Unlawful Occupiers of RIE of ERF 9 Highlands,
No. 2006/16243, slip op. at para. 35 (SCA October 16, 2007) (S.Aft.) (The Port Elizabeth discussion
is at paragraphs 33-35.).
184 Id. at
para. 38.
180
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knows it may be joined in these cases and will have to defend its housing
policy and/or come up with ad hoc solutions to address the needs of the
individual residents in future cases. At the same time, private landowners who
may be barred from evicting tenants who will become homeless have an
incentive to advocate for changes in housing policy that will satisfy
Grootboom.
Second, the court's mediation order creates the opportunity for the
government to avoid a court-directed solution by negotiating a solution directly
with the residents. If courts routinely emphasize mediation in socioeconomic
rights cases, this will create another mechanism for avoiding direct
involvement in crafting policy details even where the threat of litigation has
materialized in a second order case. The Constitutional Court already
suggested in Port Elizabeth that mediation is an important tool in
socioeconomic rights cases,' 85 and the Court's orders in the City of
Johannesburgcase discussed below have created a concrete requirement that
the government "engage" with citizens affected by their policies before taking
any legal action.'86
Requiring the routine use of these kinds of informal processes in
socioeconomic rights cases is a very direct mechanism for forcing the
government to take responsibility for implementation of these rights that has
several potential benefits. It keeps the government in dialogue with civil
society groups seeking to enforce these rights and opens up the possibility for
political solutions to develop before parties' positions harden as a result of
litigation. Furthermore, it strengthens the ability of civil society organizations
to generate political pressure on the government. If as the Court appears to
require in City of Johannesburg, the government cannot enforce (or
presumably seek to defend) its policies in court unless and until it has
"engaged" meaningfully with affected citizens, then the government at a
minimum will have to respond to the concerns of those citizens and groups
because it will ultimately have to defend the reasonableness of that response in
court. The Court recognized this potential in City of Johannesburg and
adopted what amounts to a public reporting requirement for the engagement
process to ensure that the government's response is transparent and subject to
public (and ultimately court) scrutiny.' 7
In addition to demonstrating an increased willingness by lower courts
to make government accountable for implementing Grootboom, these cases
and the two that I discuss in the following Subpart also illustrate the beginning
of a larger political mobilization around the right to housing prompted at least
in part by the Grootboom decision. In all three cases, the residents were
represented by public interest law groups who are part of a growing network of
civil society groups involved in efforts to enforce Section 26 and other
socioeconomic rights.
185

See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) at para. 39 (S.

Aft.).

,86
See infra text accompanying notes 238-48; see also Liebenberg, supra note 11, at 7 n.25 ("In
the context of evictions, the Constitutional Court has recently highlighted the importance of mediation
187See

infra text accompanying notes 238-48.
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Phillipi and Rudolph were coordinated in part by the Legal Resources
Center (LRC), one of the leading public interest law groups in South Africa,
and Geoff Budlender, one of the principal advocates for amici in the
Grootboom litigation who represented residents in both cases on behalf of the
LRC.'88 The LRC's intervention in these cases was part of a broader multifaceted strategy aimed at enforcing Section 26. As the LRC describes it on its
website: "The LRC has taken a series of cases that has made it difficult to
evict people where they have nowhere else to go. It has also attempted to
enable clarity to be provided with regard to what it is that government has to
do to realise the right to housing."'" 9 The LRC explicitly defines one aspect of
this work as "focus[ed] on seeking orders where government is ordered to
comply with Grootboom (around remedies for the poor)." °
The LRC notes that its efforts are not limited to litigation. In addition
to bringing targeted cases, the group has positioned itself as a resource for
government:
Now we continually liaise with the authorities both in
respect of law reform and about how to improve housing
delivery. Meetings have been held with provincial and
local government authorities over the last years and these
are increasing in regularity. During the course of this,
LRC lawyers have often been asked by various
departments to outline the problems that we have
identified in the course of our work in the hope that
solutions more consistent with policy can be found. "'
And the LRC is not alone in its efforts to enforce Section 26. The
LRC works with a range of other organizations to coordinate housing reform
efforts. These partnerships have resulted in a broad-based effort aimed at
securing the right to housing in a variety of ways:
These co-operative relationships with civil society
organisations enable work to be better informed and
clients to be better assisted. It also builds and sustains
democratic values. The LRC's internal educational
seminars and planning sessions often involve key
personnel from these sister organisations.92

188

See Jeremy Perelman, The Way Ahead? Access-to-Justice, PublicInterest Lawyering, and the

Right to Legal Aid in the Nkuzi Case, 41 STAN. J. INT'L LAW 357, 358 (2005) ("[Geoff] Budlender and
the LRC, a prominent South African public interest law firm, have been key actors in several

successful socio-economic-rights lawsuits brought before the South African Constitutional Court,
including Grootboom and TreatmentAction Campaign.").

189 See
Legal
Resources
Centre,
Housing
and
http://www.lrc.org.za/FocusAreas/housing.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
190
Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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The residents in Lingwood were represented by the Wits Law Clinic, at
the University of Witswatersrand. The residents relied directly on a report by
the Geneva based Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) and the
Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS),'93 a group housed at the University
of Witswatersrand that has been active in many of the post-Grootboom housing
cases. This report was the impetus for the City of Johannesburg litigation
discussed in the following Subpart in which CALS also took the lead. Thus,
Lingwood represents an extension of the emerging efforts by a range of
organizations to use Grootboom as a tool to hold the government responsible
for implementing Section 26.
Jack Balkin has described social movements in the U.S. as capable of
effecting change in constitutional meaning by gradually altering the
background legal assumptions on which courts and other legal actors rely:
"Social movements and political parties shape the contours of political and
legal reason-they help produce what is plausible and implausible
constitutionally."' 94 Balkin argues that success in changing these background
assumptions depends on the ability of social movements to deploy one of two
strategies: either working "within the [p]olitical party system to obtain
appointments of new judges and Justices sympathetic to the movement's
claims" or "chang[ing] the minds of existing judges by winning the battle for
public opinion and appealing to the elite values of the judiciary."
Two aspects of the Constitutional Court's approach have opened the
possibility for civil society organizations to change constitutional meaning in
the socioeconomic rights context through successful deployment of much more
limited political strategies. First, by refusing to establish the precise content of
these rights the Court has deliberately created a fecund ambiguity that can be
used by civil society groups to argue for a range of policies. In other words,
the Court has left the "field of legal understandings"'' 5 in the socioeconomic
rights area open. This leaves civil society organizations free to argue for
whatever policy changes they think will be most responsive to the problems
these rights are intended to address.
Second, by leaving the door open to more direct court involvement in
later cases, the Court has handed those same groups a potent lever to force the
government to take their claims seriously even absent successful advocacy
within the dominant political party or widespread change in popular opinion.
Faced with an ambiguous standard combined with the possibility of litigation
that may result in a court adopting and enforcing the interpretation of these
groups, the government has strong incentives to seriously consider their
proposals and to accommodate their claims or develop a credible alternative
that it can defend in court.
Thus, rather than preempting the potential constitutional conversation
that these rights can generate by precisely defining their content, the Court has
193 In the Matter Between Lingwood and the Unlawful Occupiers
of RIE of ERF 9 Highlands,
No. 2006/16243, slip op. at para. 7 (SCA October 16, 2007) (S. Aft.).
194 Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or
Fail to Change) the Constitution: The
Case of the New Departure, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 52 (2005).
195

Id. at 59.
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left it up to civil society and government to work together to devise policies
that they think are constitutionally sufficient. This permits a resolution that has
more democratic credibility than a court order while at the same time
preserving a role for judicial enforcement.
B. Modderklip, City of Johannesburg,and the Constitutional Court's
Response
Both the increased willingness by lower courts to make the
government accountable and the mobilization by civil society organizations
post Grootboom are reflected in the two second order housing cases that have
made their way to the Constitutional Court. In one case, the Court avoided
direct interpretation of Section 26 issue but gave some indications that it
approved of the more aggressive approach taken by the lower court. The
Court's recent opinion in the second case along with a remarkable settlement
suggests even more strongly that it remains committed to holding the
government responsible for implementing the fight to housing but that
consistent with a policentric approach the Court would prefer the government
determine the specifics steps necessary to ensure compliance. Both cases also
provide further evidence of a strengthening of the political mobilization
evident in Rudolph, Phillipi,and Lingwood.
In the first of these decisions, President of the Republic and Others v
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd and Others,'9 the Court affirmed an order of
the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) awarding damages against a local
government for its failure to enforce an eviction order against the
approximately 40,000 residents of an informal settlement that had developed
on a private landowner's property. Modderklip is significant because, while
both lower courts based their holdings in part on findings that the local
government violated Section 26(2) by failing to provide alternative temporary
housing for the illegal occupiers as required by Grootboom, the Constitutional
Court declined to reach the 26(2) question and affirmed the SCA's order on
other grounds. By eliminating 26(2) from its analysis, the Court left open the
question whether the SCA's more aggressive remedy for a 26(2) violation was
an appropriate extension of the relatively restrained remedies the Court has
appeared to favor thus far. Significantly, however, the Court found the SCA's
damages remedy appropriate in part because a declaratory
order was
97
insufficient to remedy the violation of Modderklip's rights.'
Modderklip (Pty) Ltd ("Modderklip") was part owner of land upon
which some forty thousand squatters had occupied in township north of
Johannesburg. The owners sued the occupiers for trespass but the individuals
convicted were given warnings and simply returned to the settlement upon
release.' 9
Modderklip unsuccessfully sought assistance from the local

196

President of the Republic and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd and Others
2005 (5)

SA 3 (CC) (S. Afr.).
197 Id. at para.
60.
198 Id. at para. 5.

HeinOnline -- 45 Stan. J. Int'l L. 188 2009

2009

Policentrism, Political Mobilization, and the Promise of
Socioeconomic Rights

189

authorities to deal with the problem and even offered to sell the land to the
local municipality.,
Modderklip eventually obtained an order from the Johannesburg High
Court evicting the occupiers and requiring the local sheriff to assist in the
eviction. The sheriff, however, insisted that Modderklip post a security of 1.8
million rand to cover the costs of the eviction. After additional unsuccessful
attempts to gain support from local and national government entities,
Modderklip then brought suit in the Pretoria High Court seeking an order to
compel the state to remove the occupiers and alleging violations of its rights
under Section 25(1) of the Constitution, which prohibits arbitrary deprivations
of property, its equality rights under Section 9, and the rights of the occupiers
under Section 26(2).200

The Pretoria High Court found that the illegal occupation violated
Modderklip's property rights under Section 25(1) and that this violation was
the result of the state's failure to fulfill its obligations under Sections 26(1) and
(2) to provide adequate housing to the occupiers."' Based on these and
additional findings, the court imposed a structural injunction requiring the state
to present a plan for remedying these violations."'
The state appealed to the SCA, which largely upheld the High Court's
findings but replaced the injunction with an award of damages to Modderklip
and a declaration that the occupiers were entitled to continue to occupy the
settlement until the state provided alternative housing.203 Two aspects of the
SCA's judgment deserve particular attention. First, the SCA found that the
illegal occupation was the result in part of the state's lack of any plan "for the
immediate amelioration of the circumstances of those in crisis" as required by
Grootboom.2' Thus, like the High Court, the SCA found that Grootboom's
interpretation of Section 26(2) imposed an immediate and concrete duty on the
state to provide housing in certain extreme circumstances.
Second, the SCA found that the injunction imposed by the High Court
violated the separation of powers principle by impermissibly invading the
policymaking province of the executive and legislative branches. As the SCA
stated, "[such interdicts] tend to deal with policy matters and not with the
enforcement of particular rights.... Then there is the problem of sensible
enforcement: the state must be able to comply with the order within the limits
2 5 Specifically,
of its capabilities, financial or otherwise.""
the High Court's
order "encroached on policy matters by requiring a prioritisation of the
199

Id. at para. 6.

Id. at para. 11. Modderklip also alleged that the state violated its duty under Section
7 of the
Constitution to "protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights." Id.
201Id. at para. 15. The High Court also found that the state's
refusal to assist in the eviction
infringed on Modderklip's Section 9 equality rights. Id.
202Id. at para.
16.
203 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd;
200

Presidentof the Republic of South Africa and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (2004) (6) SA
40 (SCA) at para. 52 (S. Aft.).
204 Id. at para. 22 (quoting Government of the
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11)
BCLR 1169 (CC) at para. 64 (S. Aft.)).
205 Id. at paras. 38-39.
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[existing
settlement] while there is no evidence that these people are entitled to
2
,206
it."
it

To remedy these problems, the SCA found that the "only appropriate
relief' was an award of "constitutional damages" based on the value of the
property. According to the SCA, this remedy avoids the problems that eviction
would cause while permitting the state to determine whether to ultimately
expropriate the land or find alternate housing for its residents.0 7
The Constitutional Court affirmed the SCA's judgment and remedy,
but found that it was unnecessary to determine whether the occupiers' 26(2)
housing rights were violated. 8 Instead, the Court held that the state's failure
to assist Modderklip in evicting the occupiers was principally a violation of
Modderklip's right to have access to the courts to resolve disputes under
Section 34 of the Constitution."'
The Court's interpretation of Section 34 is important because it signals
the possibility that the Court may be willing to find positive obligations in
rights other than the direct socioeconomic ones. Specifically, the Court held
that Section 34 imposes an obligation on the state to enforce court orders and
also "to take reasonable steps, where possible, to ensure that large-scale
disruptions in the social fabric do not occur in the wake of the execution of
court orders, thus undermining the rule of law." 2 ° In Modderklip's case, this
meant that the state was required to do more than rely on existing mechanisms
to enforce the eviction order because the eviction of this number of people
"would cause unimaginable social chaos and misery and untold disruption."' '
The Court found that the damages remedy imposed by the SCA was
therefore appropriate because it compensated Modderklip while leaving the
state with the ultimate responsibility for providing accommodations for the
occupiers.2 2' In doing so, the Court rejected the state's contentions that
declaratory relief was sufficient. Noting the "long history of Modderklip's
efforts to relieve its property from unlawful occupation," the Court determined
that the situation had reached a stage that required "something more effective
than the suggested clarification of [Modderklip's] rights."2"
Modderklip falls short of an outright endorsement of the use of
stronger remedies to enforce socioeconomic rights because the Court refused
to rely directly on Section 26 as a basis for affirming the constitutional
damages award. Nonetheless, the Court's repeated reference to Section 26 in
its analysis of Section 34 and its determination that declaratory relief was
inadequate to remedy the Section 34 violation in combination indicate an
206 Id. at para.
40.
207 Id. at para.

43.

208 President of the Republic and Others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty)
Ltd and Others 2005 (5)

SA 3 (CC) at para. 26 (S. Afr.).

209 Id. at paras. 39-48 ("Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be
resolved by the
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another
independent and impartial hearing or forum." (quoting S. AFR. CONST. 1996)).
210 Id. at para. 43.
211 Id. at para. 47.
212

Id. at para. 59.

213 Id. at para.
60.
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evolution towards the use of direct remedies where required to effectively
enforce socioeconomic rights.
The Constitutional Court's most recent decision, Occupiers of 51
4
Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg,"
indicates a greater willingness by the

Court to hold the government responsible for implementing Grootboom.
Rather than invoking its power to impose a direct remedy, however, the Court
instead constitutionalized a novel "engagement" requirement in housing rights
cases. Engagement, as described by the Court, forces the government to
respond directly to citizens affected by its housing policies and also includes a
public reporting requirement to ensure that the courts and other interested
groups can assess whether the government's engagement efforts were genuine
or merely a sham. CALS has hailed this decision as "a victory" not only for
the residents themselves but also "for poor occupiers more generally."2 5
City of Johannesburgbegan as a series of emergency applications in
the Witwatersrand High Court by the City of Johannesburg to evict over three
hundred people from six properties in inner-city Johannesburg. 2 6 The City
sought these evictions as part of a broader regeneration strategy, one aspect of
which was the identification, clearance, and ultimate redevelopment of "bad"
buildings in the inner-city district. 7 The National Building Regulations and
Building Standards Act (NBRA), an apartheid-era law that grants
municipalities the power to evict tenants of any building deemed unsafe or
unhealthy,2 8 provided the legal basis for the City's emergency applications.
The residents of these buildings opposed the applications on several
statutory and constitutional grounds. They claimed that the City's failure to
provide access to adequate housing as required by Section 26 of the
Constitution precluded it from evicting them.2 9
The residents also
counterclaimed seeking among other things an order that the City's housing
program failed to comply with its constitutional and statutory duties and a
structural injunction requiring the City to comply with its positive obligations
under Section 26 of the Constitution.220
The residents' opposition was the result of a coordinated effort by a
group of nonprofit organizations working together on a range of efforts to
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd.v City of Johannesburg2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) (S. Afr.).
Release, Centre for Applied Legal Studies [CALS], Constitutional Court Overturns
Supreme Court of Appeal Decision to Grant an Eviction Order in Circumstances Where the City of
Johannesburg Failed to Meaningfully Engage with the Occupiers (February 19, 2008), available at
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/.
216City of Johannesburgand Rand Properties(Pty) Ltd. 2008 (5)
BCLR 475 (CC) at para. 2 (S.
Afr.).
214

215Press

...See Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions [COHRE], Any Room for
the Poor? Forced
Evictions in Johannesburg,South Africa, at 41-46, 60-64, March 8, 2005 (describing the regeneration

plan and the practice of forced evictions).
218National Building Regulations and Building Standard Act 103
of 1977 s. 12(4)(b). See
generally Lilian Chenwi, Advancing the Right to Adequate Housing of Desperately Poor People: City
ofJohannesburg v Rand Properties, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 13 (2006); COHRE, supra note 217, at 38-

39.

219Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd. v City of Johannesburg 2008

(S. Aft'.).
220

(5) BCLR 475 (CC) at para. 11.7.18

Id.
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protect the housing rights of poor communities throughout South Africa. Prior
to the City's eviction attempts in these cases, the Geneva-based Center on
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) published an extensive report
criticizing the City's extensive eviction program and outlining legal and policy
arguments against that program.22 COHRE partnered with several other
organizations including CALS,222 and it was CALS that ultimately coordinated
the litigation strategy in the cases.223 The Community Law Centre, a public
interest research and advocacy group based at the University of the Western
Cape, joined COHRE and CALS in filing amici briefs in support of the
residents.22 '
The High Court focused exclusively on the Section 26 arguments and,
citing Grootboom, held that the City had failed to meet its obligations to create
and implement a plan that would "foster conditions to enable respondents to
have access to adequate housing in the inner city. 225 The court then ordered
the City to develop and implement a "programme to progressively realise the
right to adequate housing to people in the inner city of Johannesburg," and
enjoined the City from evicting the residents.226 The residents' victory had an
immediate impact. Despite appealing the judgment to the SCA, the City not
only ceased its attempts to evict the residents who were party to the suit, but
also put the entire inner-city eviction program on hold. 2"
In a conservatively reasoned opinion, the SCA reversed the High
Court's judgment. The SCA held that the evictions were constitutional, but the
City had an obligation to provide the evicted residents with temporary housing
consistent with recently passed national housing legislation.2" The SCA also
found that the temporary accommodations must be within the municipal region
but not the inner-city district as the High Court had ordered.2 9
The SCA noted that shortly before the City filed the eviction
applications, the central government issued a "National Housing Program in
apparent response to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in
Chapter 12 of that legislation provides grants to local
Grootboom."23
221

COHRE, supra note 217.

222See id. at 5 n. 1; see also Press Release, COHRE/CALS, Jo-Burg City
Housing Policy Goes to

Bloemfontein (Feb. 20, 2007) ("The plight of [the residents] was first brought to public attention in a
May 2005 report co-authored by researchers from the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) and
COHRE .. "),availableat http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/.
223See
University
of
the
Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg,
CALS,

http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/Rand%20Properties/Randindex.html

(summarizing the litigation and

providing links to the briefs by all parties at the SCA and Constitutional Court levels).
224 See Press Release, COHRE/CALS, supra note
222 ("The Centre for Housing Rights and
Evictions and the Community Law Centre (CLC) have been permitted to make submissions [to the
SCA] as friends of the court.").
225 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd. v City of Johannesburg
2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC) at para. 65-66
(S.Aft.).
226Id. at para.
3-4.
227 See Press Release, COHRE/CALS, supra note 222 ("In
light of the High Court's judgment,
the City appears to have suspended its mass eviction program."), available at
www cohre.org/store/attachments/Media%20Release /20-/20Joburg/2OFeb/202007.doc.
228 City ofJohannesburgv Rand Prop.(Pty) Ltd 2007
SCA 25 (SCA) at para. 78 (S.Aft.).
229Id. at paras. 75,
77.
230Id. at para.
25.
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governments for housing for people in emergency situations. The City filed a
supplementary affidavit in the SCA alleging that it had filed an application for
Chapter 12 funding just before the hearing in the High Court.13 ' But the SCA
found that city had failed to adequately pursue that application, and as a result
it was only able to offer temporary shelter to evicted residents for up to two
weeks.232

Citing this weak effort, the SCA acknowledged that "there is little
evidence to demonstrate what the City has actually done" to comply with its
obligation to provide access to adequate housing under Section 26. But it
nonetheless found that this was not "the case in which to attempt to make an
assessment of the extent to which the City has or has not made acceptable
progress towards fulfilling its obligation ....

,233

Instead, the SCA limited its

relief to requiring the City to provide temporary shelter to the evicted residents.
The SCA found that this limited relief was "eminently fair" because "it only
caters for those who are to be evicted [and therefore] cannot tax its budget
'
unduly."234

The residents appealed the SCA's order to the Constitutional Court,
which accepted the application in May 2007.23 The Court heard oral argument
on August 28, 2007 and two days later issued an interim order in the case.
That order is extraordinary in several respects. First, procedurally the order is
highly unusual if not unique in the Court's history. The order required the
parties to "engage with each other meaningfully ... in an effort to resolve the

differences and difficulties aired in this application in light of the values of the
Constitution, the constitutional and statutory duties of the municipality and the
rights and duties of the citizens concerned. 236 It also required the parties to
file affidavits reporting the results of the negotiations with the Court
approximately one month later on October 3, 2007.23 The Court was in effect
ordering the parties to try and work out a solution themselves before the Court
issued its judgment.
Finally, the last paragraph of the order stated that the Court would take
into account "the affidavits in the preparation of the judgment in this matter for
the issuing of further directions, should this become necessary. 3. Thus, the
Court signaled to the parties that if their negotiations result in a compromise
that the Court views as sufficient, it might be unnecessary for the Court to take
any further action in the case.

231 Id. at para. 26.
232Id.atpara. 77.
233 Id. at para. 74.
234

Id.

235 See

Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburgv City

of Johannesburg,No. CCT 24/07 (S. Afr. Aug. 30, 2007) (order requiring the parties to engage with
each other to resolve the issues and to alleviate the plight of the applicants and requiring the parties to
file
affidavits
reporting
the
results
of
the
engagement),
available
at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/I 0731 .PDF.
236Id. at para.
1.
237Id. at para.
3.
238 Id. at para. 4 (emphasis
added).

HeinOnline -- 45 Stan. J. Int'l L. 193 2009

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

45:151

Remarkably, the Court's extraordinary effort appears to have worked.
The parties reached a mutually satisfactory settlement that resulted in real
change to the City of Johannesburg's policy. Among other things, the
settlement requires the City in the short term to take specific measures to make
the existing buildings safer and more habitable by cleaning the buildings and
providing sanitation services, access to water, and functioning toilets.239 Before
relocating the residents from the buildings designated for redevelopment, the
City agreed to refurbish several other buildings in inner-city Johannesburg to at
least provide "security against eviction; access to sanitation; access to potable
2 ' and to limit
water; access to electricity for heating, lighting and cooking;""
any rental fees to no more than twenty-five percent of the occupants' monthly
income.24 ' The City also agreed to consult with the residents on the "provision
of suitable permanent housing solutions . . . having regard to applicable
national, provincial and municipal housing policies."2 '2
The settlement did not resolve all of the issues in the case, and the
Constitutional Court issued its final opinion and order on February 19, 2008.
Several aspects of this relatively brief decision are particularly important.
First, it is clear that the Court continues to prefer political over legal solutions.
The Court specifically refused to deal with the residents' broader claim that the
City still lacked a comprehensive housing plan as required by Grootboom.
Citing the City's commitment in the settlement agreement to develop a longterm housing plan in consultation with the residents, the Court found that
"[t]here is every reason to believe that negotiations will continue in good
faith. 2, 1 The Court noted that the City's position had evolved considerably as
demonstrated by the City's "willingness to engage," and in language echoing
its reasons for refusing to issue an injunction in TAC, the Court expressed
optimism that "[t]here is no reason to think that future engagement will not be
meaningful and will not lead to a reasonable result.",2" The Court then
emphasized that while both parties had a "duty" to continue to negotiate, court
intervention remains an enforcement option "if this course becomes
necessary. 2 3
Second, the Court formalized the negotiation/mediation requirement
that it had begun to develop in earlier cases. The Court adopted the term
"engagement" to describe this requirement and spent fourteen paragraphs of
this fifty-four paragraph judgment explaining the need for engagement among
the government, affected citizens, and civil society organizations to develop
effective socioeconomic policies.

239 Settlement Agreement Between City of Johannesburg
and the Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road,
Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg, at paras. 2-4, Oct. 29, 2007. (copy on file with
author) [hereinafter City of Johannesburg Partial Settlement].
240 Id. at para. 6.
241 Id. at para. 7.

Id. at para. 18.
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v City of Johannesburg,No. CCT 24/07,
slip
op. at *39 (CC Feb. 19, 2008) (S. Aft.).
242
243

244
245

Id.
Id.
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The Court first situated the engagement requirement in its earlier cases
citing as examples the disappointment it had expressed in Grootboom over the
City's failure to deal "on a case-by-case" basis with the problems faced by the
Grootboom residents and also its call for "respectful ... engagement or
mediation" in Port Elizabeth.2 6 The Court emphasized that "[e]ngagement has
the potential to contribute towards the resolution of disputes and to increased
understanding and sympathetic care if both sides are willing to participate in
the process."247 Beyond this practical benefit, the Court found that a range of
constitutional provisions, most importantly the right to human dignity and the
right to life, requirethat the government "meaningfully engage[]" with citizens
affected by its policies. 4 ' To meet constitutional muster, at most levels of
government engagement must be more than a merely "ad hoc" process.2 49 In
the context of this case, the Court noted that the City of Johannesburg's
regeneration strategy should have incorporated an engagement plan at the
outset "when [it] must have been apparent that the eviction of a large number
of people was inevitable.""2 ' The Court also emphasized the central role of
civil society in this process, emphasizing that "[c]ivil society organizations that
support the peoples' claims should preferably facilitate the engagement process
in every possible way. 2 '
In addition, to ensure the possibility of meaningful court review of the
engagement process, the Court established what amounts to a public reporting
requirement for the government following engagement. After noting that
''secrecy is counter-productive to the process of engagement," the Court
emphasized that, at least for municipal eviction proceedings, "the provision of
a complete and accurate account of the process of engagement including at
least the reasonable efforts of the municipality with that process would
ordinarily be essential. 252 Courts are then required to consider "[w]hether
there had been meaningful engagement between a city and the resident about
to be rendered homeless" when considering a challenge under Section 26.255
C. Prospectsfor the Future
In its early cases, it is evident that the Court exercised a more
restrained role for itself than the Constitution arguably permits. This is
particularly clear from the Court's largely consistent refusal to provide
remedies more direct than declarations of unconstitutionality. Nonetheless, the
Court has at the same time clearly carved out the possibility for a more robust
and direct role in enforcing these rights by establishing the potential to grant
injunctions and other relief. The High Court orders in Rudolph, Phillipi,
246

Id. at paras. 10-12.

247Id. at para. 25.
248 Id. at

para. 26.

249 Id.

at para. 29.
Id.
251 Id.
252 Id. at paras.
30-3 1.
253 Id. at para. 31.
250
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Modderklip, Lingwood, and City of Johannesburgdemonstrate the willingness
of lower South African courts to invoke those stronger remedies where the
government's response to a declaration of unconstitutionality is inadequate.
This willingness by lower courts to take seriously the power to issue more
direct remedies and to engage in more direct review answers at least in part the
criticism that the Court's approach to socioeconomic rights has been overly
deferential.
But the High Court orders also raise important questions about the
ability of courts to effectively implement strong-form remedies. The acute
housing shortage in South Africa is an excellent example of the considerable
challenges a court must confront when it intervenes directly in policy setting
for the state. The government parties in both Rudolph and Modderklip argued
that it was inappropriate for the Court to grant a direct remedy to the illegal
occupiers precisely because doing so would preference these individuals over
the many other individuals in the same situation.
The court in Rudolph recognized this problem and rather than grant the
individual applicants direct relief, it ordered the City to deliver a report "stating
what steps it has taken to comply with its constitutional and statutory
obligations" as described in the order as well as "what future steps it will take
in that regard, and when such future steps will be taken. 21 4 While this is a
significant step beyond the declarations the Constitutional Court limited its
remedies to in all direct socioeconomic rights cases except Khosa, the order
still leaves ample room for the government to develop its own policy and
equally important is consistent with the Constitutional Court's interpretation
that these rights do not operate in most cases to provide individual remedies.
Thus, despite tending towards the stronger end of the spectrum, the Rudolph
order retains the flexibility that defines policentric review. In particular, the
court's order leaves open the opportunity for the government to maintain a fair
degree of control over the specifics of the policy changes because the court
gave the City of Cape Town the opportunity to develop its own response to the
constitutional deficiencies and thereby to define the content of the right to
housing by proposing a policy it believes satisfies that right.
Likewise, the Constitutional Court's damages remedy in Modderklip
(although not directly enforcing Section 26) combined with the declaration that
the occupiers were entitled to continue occupying the land until the state
provided an alternative permitted the government to determine for itself how
best to accommodate the illegal residents. This represents a compromise
between court oversight of the details of the process and deference to
legislative and executive judgments over broader policies.
But the Court's orders in City of Johannesburg are perhaps the best
evidence that it will remain firmly committed to encouraging the government
to take the lead in implementing these rights. Faced with consistent rulings at
both Court and SCA levels ordering direct relief against the City of
Johannesburg, the Court attempted one more time to force the parties to come
up with their own solution to the apparent Section 26 violations. This reflects
254

City of Cape Town v Rudolph 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (CC) at 89 (S. Afr.).
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a direct version of the Court's call in Grootboom and TAC for civil society to
work with government to craft effective policies or implementing these rights.
And consistent with the principles of policentric review, the order gave the
government one last opportunity to come up with a revised policy that is the
product of negotiation rather than court order. The Court also reassured the
government that it would not only take into account the negotiated settlement
in deciding the case but that it might not even have to issue any further
directions if the result of the negotiations is satisfactory.
Grootboom and the national housing legislation that followed it were
instrumental in creating the necessary pressure on the City to force this change.
And the specific terms of this settlement arguably go well beyond what the
Constitutional Court would have required if it had accepted the responsibility
of crafting a specific relief order in that case. Thus, the flexibility that
Grootboom left open resulted at least in this case in the opportunity to craft a
detailed policy to provide tailored relief to meet the specific needs of a
particular group of individuals-affordable housing in the inner city.
In its final order, the Court then made the process that resulted in this
remarkable settlement a constitutional requirement in all housing rights cases.
Following City of Johannesburg,the government at all levels is now required
to take seriously the concerns of affected citizens and demonstrate that
sincerity by documenting and making public the steps that it has taken in each
case. Courts are specifically required to assess whether or not that engagement
process was meaningful in deciding housing rights cases. Combined with the
threat that a court might take more direct action if it finds the government's
actions fall short of the constitutional requirements, this engagement
requirement is another flexible mechanism for obtaining meaningful
enforcement while minimizing court involvement. In addition, the Court has
once again emphasized the importance of civil society to meaningful
enforcement by calling for their involvement in this new constitutionally
required process.
To be sure, as the SCA opinion acknowledges, "the government at all
levels and the City in particular have yet to firmly grasp the nettle of the
obligations they have towards the poor, 255 but the City of Johannesburg
decision and settlement are steps in the right direction. And it is not
unreasonable to expect that the City's experience with that litigation coupled
with this new requirement will have broader effects both on the City's own
planning process and on other municipalities facing similar situations. Indeed,
according to CALS, the litigation has already "been seized as an opportunity
for much needed mobilisation of Johannesburg's inner city poor" and resulted
in a marked increase in requests for legal assistance in preventing forced
evictions.256
These examples also provide a potential response to the risk identified
by Tushnet that an evolution from weak-form to strong-form review of strong
socioeconomic rights because of political resistance to strong remedies will
255

City ofJohannesburgv Rand Prop. (Pty) Ltd 2007 SCA 25 (SCA) at para. 73 (S.Afr.).

256

CALS Spring 2006 Newsletter Vol. 1 at 6.
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eliminate the benefits of weak-form review.57 On the one hand, the possibility
for evolution towards more direct remedies that these cases present reflects the
instability that Tushnet suggests is inherent in weak-form review. But the
trend of the Court's current approach indicates that if such evolution occurs in
a specific case, it will not mean that the Court will revert to strong form review
in all cases dealing with socioeconomic rights. Rather, the Court has also
repeatedly emphasized that the nature of the socioeconomic rights in the South
African Constitution demand an incremental and highly contextual approach.
The use of targeted and specific strong remedies in second order cases
where the government's initial response has been inadequate would give the
Constitutional Court (and lower courts) a more direct role in the enforcement
of these rights and would ensure at least limited action by the government in
specific cases. This does not necessarily mean that the Court must then impose
the same strong remedies in subsequent cases interpreting the same right where
the government has not yet had the opportunity to respond to a weak remedy."8
To the contrary, rather than trapping the Court in a strong-form review mode,
limiting the use of strong remedies to cases in which a weak remedy has
proved ineffective in the first instance arguably will enhance the effectiveness
of weak remedies in subsequent decisions. This is because the government
will have a stronger incentive to take seriously its obligations to adjust the
program to conform with the Court's order because failure to do so may result
in the Court taking more direct control.
The flexibility to alternate between weaker and stronger remedies is
one of the signature characteristics of a policentric mode of review and
provides the possibility for give and take between the judiciary and the other
branches of government. In the later stages of the layered process that is
possible through policentric review, it is perfectly appropriate for the Court to
take a stronger role in response to governmental resistance to cooperating in
the process.
Under policentric review, the government retains the power to come
back to the court after initially grappling with the rejection of a specific
program and argue in favor of an interpretation that is different both from the
government's initial stance in the first case and the court's initial interpretation
and to justify that new interpretation on the basis of its experience with
implementation. Where, however, the government merely ignores the court's
257

See Tushnet, Marbury, supra note 108, at 267 ("I have become skeptical about the claims

made on behalf of weak-form systems of review, largely because such systems seem to me to
degenerate into strong-form systems.").
258 The Kyalami Ridge case is an excellent example of the Court moving back towards weaker
review. Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Ass 'n (2001) (7) BCLR 652 (CC) (S. Aft.). In that
case, the government planned to build new housing projects for homeless and victims of a flood on
state-owned land. Neighboring homeowners sued to enjoin the project arguing that the planned
project was ultra vires because there was no specific Parliamentary authorization. The Court rejected
the residents' arguments, agreeing with the government that Section 26 and Grootboom imposed a
duty to respond to the kind of emergency housing needs the project was intended to address. Id. at
para. 39. Frank Michelman suggests that this is an example of "how a court may act usefully in
furtherance of a constitutional social rights guarantee by the most conventional of all forms of judicial
action, namely, dismissal of a case (where relief would have been forthcoming but for the guarantee)."
Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 13, 17 (2003). For that same reason, Kyalami Ridge demonstrates the Court's ability and
willingness to move back towards the weaker end of the continuum where the goverment has taken
the lead in enforcing these rights.
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rejection of its initial policy and implements a program substantially similar to
the rejected program (or no program at all), the court is then justified in
intervening more directly.

But as Rudolph and City of Johannesburg

demonstrate, intervening directly will not always require a court to develop
policies itself and instead may simply require more direct oversight of the
government's own efforts to develop and implement policy combined with
general guidance on the needs that those policies must address.
Perhaps more importantly, the Court's emphasis on civil society
working with (and presumably at times against) government to implement
these rights offers the hope that the political will necessary for meaningful
enforcement will develop over time. Had the Court ordered more specific
changes and retained oversight to enforce those changes in its initial cases,
there are real questions whether the government would have resisted such
direct involvement. The Court's emphasis on early weak remedies and its
repeated calls for civil society involvement in enforcement are attempts to
develop the political circumstances that might make possible meaningful
change. By prodding the government slowly but consistently and setting up
the possibility for more direct involvement in later cases, the Court is
attempting to preserve the power of these rights as potential agents of change
while stimulating the development of a political environment in which real
change might actually occur.
Brand argues that the Court's current approach has all but eliminated
the ability of the socioeconomic rights provisions to act as catalysts for the
development of new policies rather than mere correctives to existing
constitutionally insufficient policies." 9 I think the precise opposite is true. By
putting the debate over both the interpretation and the enforcement of these
rights squarely in the political sphere, the Court is trying to develop a political
constituency for these rights and to encourage the use of strategies other than
litigation to fulfill them.
There are at least tentative signs that this in fact is happening. The
LRC's advising role to government cited above is just one example. CALS
has leveraged its experience litigating Section 26 cases to call for legislative
and policy changes in other contexts. For example, the joint report CALS
issued with COHRE on Johannesburg's redevelopment policy not only served
as a basis for the City of Johannesburglitigation, but CALS also plans to use
that same report over the longer term "to raise national and international
awareness of evictions and relocations in Johannesburg and to begin lobbying
government to consider alternatives to the status quo. 260 In addition, drawing
on many of the post-Grootboom cases described here, CALS in February 2007
submitted to Parliament critical comments on proposed amendments to the
PIE.26' All of these are examples of civil society employing the socioeconomic
259 Brand, supra note 11, at 54-55 ("The Constitutional Court's failure to pose anything other
than procedural standards in its adjudication of socio-economic rights limits the effectiveness of these
rights as 'policy-structuring devices."').
260 CALS, http://web.wits.ac.za/Academic/Centres/CALS/HousingAndEvictions/
(last visited
Feb. 11, 2009); see also COHRE, supra note 217.
261 CALS, COMMENT ON GENERAL NOTICE 1851
OF 2006: PREVENTION OF ILLEGAL EVICTION
FROM AND UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION OF LAND AMENDMENT BILL 2006, at paras. 8-25 (2007),
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rights as a lever for implementing changes not only through litigation but also
by other means of civic and political engagement. There is good reason to
think that changes wrought through these political mechanisms are more likely
to succeed in the long run than a court order establishing the same policy
would have.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is undeniably the case that for citizens who live in extreme poverty,
the promise of the so-called negative civil and political rights is incomplete.
Those rights are designed to protect against unwarranted government intrusion
into the lives of its citizens and ensure that they have the freedom to pursue
productive and fulfilling lives. Yet, for a person who cannot afford to feed,
house, or care for herself, such protections mean very little. Understood in this
way, the familiar typology in which socioeconomic rights are deemed "second
generation ' is a reversal of reality. Rather than secondary, these rights are
primary in the most basic sense that they are required to make the promise of
democracy and its protection of liberty meaningful at all.
At the same time, judicial enforcement of socioeconomic rights places
courts in the difficult and challenging role of intervening into complex disputes
over the allocation of public resources and the development of social policy.
On the one hand, involving courts too directly in such disputes threatens the
democratic legitimacy of any resolution and undermines the willingness of the
government to fully implement the court-crafted policies that result. On the
other hand, an approach that defers to government judgments in all but the
most egregious cases risks reducing these rights into nothing more than "good
governance" standards. 263
The Constitutional Court's early record interpreting the socioeconomic
rights provisions in the South African Constitution suggests that it has begun to
chart a middle course between these extremes. By taking a restrained approach
in initial challenges to particular government programs or actions, the Court is
placing the burden on the government to develop policies to effectively
implement these rights.
The Court's repeated calls for civil society
involvement reinforces the emphasis on developing political rather than legal
solutions to the social problems these rights are intended to address. Pairing
this with preservation of the possibility for more direct court involvement in
targeted cases creates the prospect for effective long-term solutions to develop
in a process that enhances the prospects for meaningful political change.
To be sure, significant questions remain regarding the long-term
effectiveness of this approach. The Court has yet to confront what Brand
describes as the "difficult" case-a challenge to a comprehensive policy
calling for changes that would have significant budgetary implications." And
availableat http://www.law.wits.ac.za/cals/CALSPIESUBMISSION.pdf.
262See, e.g., Mureinik, supra note 13, at 464 (describing
the difference between "firstgeneration" and "second-generation" rights).
263See Brand, supra note 11,
at 49.
264 Id. at 53.
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it is by no means clear that the political mobilization that has begun to develop
in the wake of the Court's early cases will continue to strengthen or to generate
effective responses by the South African government. But there are promising
indications at least that the role for judicial enforcement of these rights the
Court has carved out may result over the long term in policies that fulfill their
promise.
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